| Over the past decades a judicialization process of international dispute settlement procedures has taken place. Yet, the
judicialization of procedures remains meaningless if the procedures are not used and accepted by disputing states in practice.
Prominent theoretical approaches point to different conditions under which this is to be expected. Realists emphasize the international
distribution of power, institutionalists stress the importance of the institutional design of international dispute settlement procedures, and liberalism points to the domestic institutional setting of the
participating states. The paper confronts these theoretical expectations with states’ actual dispute settlement behavior in the
international trade regime (GATT/WTO), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the European Human Rights regime (EHR)
and the regime on the protection of endangered species (CITES) in the 1970/1980s and 1990/2000s, respectively. Its main finding is
that, compared to realism and liberalism, institutionalism fares better in explaining the judicialization of states’ dispute settlement
behavior. |
Zangl, Bernhard
Helmedach, Achim
Mondré, Aletta
Neubauer, Gerald
Blome, Kerstin
Kocks, Alexander
2012
in: European Journal of International Relations, vol. 18 (2), pp. 369-401
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