Transformations
of the State

CRC 597

TranState
Working Papers

MAGIC MIRROR ON THE WALL, WHO
IN THE WORLD IS LEGITIMATE AFTER ALL?
LEGITIMACY CLAIMS OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

DOMINIKA BIEGOŃ
JENNIFER GRONAU
HENNING SCHMIDTKE

No. 169

Dominika Biegoń
Jennifer Gronau
Henning Schmidtke

**Magic Mirror on the Wall,
who in the World is Legitimate After All?
Legitimacy Claims of International Institutions**

TranState Working Papers

No. 169

Universität Bremen

Sonderforschungsbereich 597 / Collaborative Research Center 597

Staatlichkeit im Wandel / Transformations of the State

Postfach 33 04 40

D - 28334 Bremen

Tel.:+ 49 421 218-56644

Fax:+ 49 421 218-56633

Homepage: http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de

Magic Mirror on the Wall, who in the World is Legitimate After All? Legitimacy Claims of International Institutions

ABSTRACT

The legitimacy of international institutions is a contested issue both in terms of concept formation and empirical evidence and attracts attention from across the political sciences. The present contribution posits a relational concept of legitimacy that includes self-justification of rulers on the one hand, and legitimacy beliefs of the ruled on the other hand. By taking a top-down perspective, our conceptual section explores an underdeveloped aspect in the field of legitimacy research. We posit that the analysis of political elites' self-legitimations can considerably contribute to our understanding of governing activities and provide a more thorough picture of legitimation processes. These practices play a key role in transforming mere power into popularly accepted, stable authority and have an essentially communicative nature. Hence, self-legitimations are amenable to discourse analysis. In this conjunction, the paper assumes that the media functions as a discursive battleground creating a space for positive or negative evaluations of political orders, including affirmative contributions of the representatives of challenged organizations themselves. The conceptual and theoretical link between legitimacy, self-legitimizing practices, and discourse analysis is further developed in the first section of the paper.

Subsequently, our conceptualization of self-legitimizing practices is empirically exemplified. Our explorative study of self-legitimating statements of representatives of three major international institutions (EU, G8, and UN) in media discourses is based on a large qualitative data-set which analyzes legitimacy discourses in two high-quality newspapers in four Western democracies (GB, US, DE, and CH) over a period of ten years (1998-2007). Our empirical findings demonstrate that international institutions' formal representatives and member states actively take part in the process of legitimation. Hence, global governance arrangements are not only objects of legitimacy demands, but at the same time cultivators of their own legitimacy.

CONTENTS

Magic Mirror on the Wall, who in the World is Legitimate After All? Legitimacy Claims of International Institutions

1. INTRODUCTION[1]

> *"When one turns from generalization about rulers to consideration of individual cases, one is struck by the observation that the urge to possess and exercise power is usually qualified by concern about the justification of such possession and exercise. Among statesmen, the lovers of naked power are far less typical than those who aspire to clothe themselves in the mantle of legitimate authority; emperors may be nude, but they do not like to be so, to think themselves so, or to be so regarded"* (Claude 1966: 368).

It is almost fifty years ago, since Inis L. Claude shared the observations he made within the context of the UN system: apparently, rulers want to be legitimate and therefore engage in justifications. Surprisingly, research on legitimacy in general and the legitimacy of international institutions in particular has hardly drawn attention to the question of how, and by which means, political elites and institutions attempt to shape legitimacy actively, and whether such self-legitimation efforts are an effective means of stabilizing the legitimacy basis of political institutions. Although quite a few authors have pointed to such an elite-centered perspective (e.g. Barker 2001; Clark 2005; Reus-Smit 2007), corresponding empirical analyses are still missing. Following Max Weber, who has drawn attention to practices of self-legitimation and self-justification at various instances in his work (e.g. Weber 1978: 213), we argue that the *self-legitimation of international institutions* is a highly relevant topic for a systematic empirical inquiry. Self-legitimation efforts of international institutions are not only considered to be a relevant aspect of research on the legitimacy of international institutions they also provide important insights into their inner workings.

Having identified this gap in legitimacy research, the present paper introduces and applies a top-down perspective to legitimation processes and suggests a conceptualization of self-legitimation that is applicable to empirical inquiry. Since rulers' self-legitimizing efforts may assume a variety of different shapes, we provide a two-dimensional typology that helps to structure diverse activities ranging from the distribu-

---

tion of presents by the rotating presidency of the G8-summits to national delegations to the taking of the so called EU summit family photos over to public statements in which representatives of international institutions explicitly attribute legitimacy to their respective institution. Our typology differentiates on the one hand between internal and external and on the other hand between explicit and implicit self-legitimation strategies. It provides a research agenda for the systematic analysis of this major aspect of empirical processes of legitimation.

The paper proceeds as follows: The theoretical section introduces our basic understanding of the concept of legitimacy and summarizes the respective debates on the empirical legitimacy of international institutions (2). As the main conclusion of this discussion, we note that most empirical research neglects the question of how political elites and their self-legitimation strategies influence legitimation processes. To address this research gap we provide a conceptualization of legitimizing efforts of political elites and introduce our typology (3). The final section demonstrates how an empirical analysis of self-legitimations of representatives of the European Union (EU), the Group of Eight (G8) and the United Nations (UN) may be conducted (4). Our results indicate that self-legitimations are indeed a relevant aspect of legitimation processes.

2. LEGITIMACY RESEARCH: CONCEPTS AND PERSPECTIVES

Research on the legitimacy of political orders has become increasingly nuanced in the past decades. We witness a differentiation of conceptual presumptions as well as the expansion of the concept's field of application. While the term legitimacy has been limited for a long time to the evaluation of the nation state, more recent research is increasingly interested in legitimacy issues of international institutions and non-state actors such as NGOs or private companies. To situate the present paper in this field, the following section provides a short conceptual clarification and summarizes the recent research on the legitimacy of international institutions.

The research field of political legitimacy is often divided into an empirical and a normative strand. In normative variants of legitimacy research the term refers to the rightfulness or acceptability of political authority (Bernstein 2005; Buchanan/Keohane 2006; Hurrelmann et al. 2007: 3). Here political theorists engage in an evaluation of the rightfulness of a political order according to the proximity or distance from normative standards which they promote (Barker 2007: 20).

The second – empirical – strand of legitimacy research which draws on Max Weber's work on legitimacy and legitimate domination, defines the term from the perspective of those affected by domination. Here, an authority is considered to be legitimate "if its subjects believe it to be so" – as Ian Clark (2005: 79) has succinctly put it. In this perspective researchers assume an observer's perspective and gauge the legitimacy assess-

ments of others – citizens, publics, and as advocated in this paper by the rulers themselves – and their normative benchmarks as social facts (Barker 2001; Gilley 2009; Reus-Smit 2007). With the focus on legitimation efforts of political elites, our paper is clearly situated within the empirical strand of legitimacy research.

The existing literature on the empirical legitimacy of international institutions (Ecker-Ehrhardt/Zürn 2007; Gronau et al. 2009; Nonhoff et al. 2009; Nullmeier et al. 2010; Quack 2010; Zürn et al. 2007) already encompasses detailed studies dealing with the quality of political support enjoyed by specific international institutions such as the G8 (Gronau 2010a), the UN (Cronin/Hurd 2008; Morris/Wheeler 2007; Schmidtke 2010) and the EU (Biegoń 2010; Hix 2008; Thomassen 2009). The general conclusion that can be drawn from these empirical studies is threefold: First, Michael Zürn and his colleagues (2004; 2006; 2007) contend that more and more international institutions are faced with serious societal acceptance problems (see also Nanz/Steffek 2004). While questions of the legitimacy of international institutions have long been an issue solely of interest for small academic circles, an awareness of the shortcomings of global governance arrangements seems to have reached the broader public (Schmidtke 2011). International institutions increasingly run the risk of being seriously questioned both by national governments as well as their citizens.

Second, scholars observe that the normative criteria applied to evaluate the legitimacy of international institutions seem to become more demanding and are no longer restricted to performance criteria (Dingwerth 2011; Buchanan/Keohane 2006; Christiano 2011) – a benchmark which has long dominated the evaluation of international institutions (Beetham/Lord 1998: 12). Democratic normative standards hitherto applied for the evaluations of the nation state's legitimacy, e.g. input criteria, such as representativeness and participation, and throughput criteria, such as transparency and accountability, are transferred to the international context (Seabrocke 2007). The plausibility of both assumptions – recently discussed under the heading of the "politicization" of international institutions (cf. Ecker-Ehrhardt/Zürn 2007; Zürn et al. 2007; from a critical point of view Brock 2007; Nölke 2007; Wiener 2009; Nonhoff 2009) – are illustrated by the rise of transnational mass protests against e.g. the WTO, the IMF and the EU.[2]

---

[2] The recently proposed theory of the politicization of international institutions assumes that civil society actors increasingly make use of democratic benchmarks to evaluate international institutions. In line with the theory of politicization of international institutions put forward by Zürn and his colleagues, especially those governance arrangements equipped with the process of majority rule or quasi-judicial settlements are affected. Mass protests do, indeed, serve as an indicator for international institutions' acceptance problems, but further investigations need to be done to qualify the argument of a shift of norms from performance to democratically more substantial ones.

Finally, most empirical studies dealing with the empirical legitimacy of international institutions have a common point of departure - which at the same time constitutes the research gap to be addressed in this contribution: They favor a bottom-up approach investigating the attitudes, behavior and evaluations of citizens and nation states towards international institutions and are, thus, solely concerned with the question of how subjects of international institutions' authority contribute to the legitimation process. What is still largely missing is an *elite-centered perspective*, which pays attention to the legitimation efforts employed by international institutions and its representatives. In other words, what has hitherto been neglected is the "impulse of the powerful to try to legitimate their power" (Hurd 1999: 388). Although such an elite-centered perspective on legitimation has been hinted at by various authors (Barker 2001; Clark 2005, 2007; Reus-Smit 2007) it has rarely been applied to empirical research dealing with the legitimacy of international institutions (for an exception see Halliday et al. 2010). Given that in the post-national constellation, global governance arrangements are faced with growing acceptance problems and resistance, it is particularly insightful to adopt an elite-centered focus and study in greater detail how exactly international institutions are reacting to rising demands and potentially decreasing levels of political support. More generally speaking, the study of self-legitimations does not only enhance our understanding of legitimation processes. Furthermore, it also sheds light on the inner workings of international institutions and their efforts to maintain authority.

3. SELF-LEGITIMATIONS – A TOP-DOWN PERSPECTIVE ON LEGITIMATION

The previous remarks have demonstrated that self-legitimations constitute an indeed auspicious but under-researched object. A more thorough conceptualization of self-legitimations is necessary to make it amenable to empirical research. The concept has its theoretical roots in Max Weber's sociology, where he coined the terms legitimacy claim or self-justification respectively (1978: 213, 954). There are various instances in Weber's work in which he points out that the claiming of legitimacy is a ubiquitous activity in which political leaders constantly engage:

> *"Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addition every such system attempts to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy. But according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff, and the mode of exercising authority will differ fundamentally. Equally fundamental is variation in effect. Hence, it is useful to classify the types of domination according to the claim to legitimacy typically made by each" (Weber 1978: 213).*

The concept of self-legitimation denotes a top-down process in which political elites take center stage as "producers of legitimacy". In contrast to the prevailing use of the term legitimation, which conceives of government as the recipient or beneficiary of legitimacy beliefs of subjects (Barker 2001: 43), Weber's legitimacy theory includes a notion of government as an active and initiating actor (ibid.), which goes to great lengths in establishing or maintaining its legitimacy. From this perspective it is the "rulers (…), not the citizens, who are the active players" (ibid.: 108) in legitimation processes.

There are a number of authors who have explicitly taken up this "ruler-centric" (Merquior 1980: 306) perspective on legitimation and developed this approach further. For instance, David Easton (1975; 1979: 247-342) and Renate Mayntz (1975) have suggested different conceptualizations and classifications of self-legitimations of political elites. The work by Michael Saward (2006; 2010) and his reconceptualization of a theory of representation likewise emphasizes top-down processes of legitimation.[3] Above all, Rodney Barker (2001; 2003) has made one of the most comprehensive attempts to put political elites and not citizens at the center of the conceptualization of legitimation. Yet, with the exception of Saward, the above mentioned studies have, to a large extent, mainly dealt with top-down legitimation processes in a national context with only minor references to how international institutions' self-legitimations might look like (Barker 2003; see also Halliday et al. 2010). While adopting this top-down perspective on legitimation processes and by drawing on the insights explicated by the above mentioned authors we propose to apply this research perspective on legitimation to the study of international institutions.

3.1 Varieties of Self-Legitimations

On a most general level self-legitimations can be understood as practices employed by political elites to positively influence the legitimation process. This rather broad definition covers a whole range of different types of self-legitimations. For analytical purposes it is helpful to distinguish two dimensions along which self-legitimations vary: internal-external, implicit-explicit. In this section we discuss these key lines of variation of self-legitimations as a way of mapping some of its main features.

---

[3] Saward advances the idea of a representative claim and sketches a revised theory of representation. In contrast to traditional accounts of representation, he takes non-electoral forms of representation seriously and emphasizes the importance of performance to representation. He suggests that "representation in politics is at least a two way street: the represented play a role in choosing representatives, and representatives 'chose' their constituencies in the sense of portraying them or framing them in particular contestable ways" (Saward 2006: 302).

Internal or external self-legitimations are the first two central variants that can be distinguished analytically. At the core of this distinction is the *audience* of self-legitimations. The audience is the group of persons who are addressed and receive, i.e. hear, read, watch etc., the self-legitimations of political elites. Attempts to legitimize themselves as political rulers may occur within an international institution or in the wider public. Self-legitimations that take place among a small circle of political elites within the international institutions – e.g. within the bureaucracy – are understood to be internal. External self-legitimations, by contrast, are usually voiced publicly and are perceived by a significantly wider circle of people. It goes without saying, that a clear-cut differentiation of external and internal self-legitimations can only be drawn analytically. Of course, those legitimizing themselves will never have complete control over how their claims are communicated and who receives them. Documents addressing international institutions' officials, constituting examples of internal self-legitimation may, for instance, be taken up by the media and might then have an impact on the wider public. Nevertheless, differentiating practices of self-legitimation with respect to the primary audience can help to get to grips with different, indeed very heterogeneous, forms of cultivating legitimacy.

Rodney Barker has attributed particular importance to internal forms of self-legitimations. He asserts "that rulers are not in the first instance concerned about what those whom they rule think, nor whether their own cultivated image of themselves is recognized and approved by ordinary people" (Barker 2001: 106). Instead, he claims, it is the relationship between the administrative staff and the rulers that is of vital importance for the stability of a political system. By underlining the relevance of internal self-legitimations, Barker draws on Weber who has likewise emphasized that the recognition of authority by the administrative staff plays a pivotal role (Weber 1978: 122).[4]

In the international context, internal forms of self-legitimations take place between member states and their officials, between member states and the secretariat of international institutions or between different bureaucratic departments of an international institution (Buchanan 2011). In fact, research dealing with the legitimacy of international politics has long focused exclusively on internal forms of legitimation, since legitimacy has long been considered to be an issue among states (Steffek 2007: 175, see also Nullmeier et al. 2010). In the early research on international legitimacy it was the acceptance of international institutions by states that dominated the academic debate (e.g. Hurd

---

[4]   Many scholars dealing with the fall of the Soviet regime have followed this perspective underlining that it were processes of internal legitimation that were deficient and that finally led to the downfall of the Soviet empire (Rigby/Fehér 1982).

1999: 401). Beetham and Lord sum up this traditional model of international legitimacy as follows:

> *"Like any other political body exercising jurisdiction, international institutions require justification in terms of the purposes or ends they serve, which cannot be met by other means, in this case the nation states themselves, or at the individual state level. (...) Yet, such justifications rarely percolate out beyond a narrow elite group; nor do they need to, it could be argued, since these institutions are not dependent on the cooperation of a wider public to effect their purposes. It is not the direct cooperation of ordinary citizens that is required to maintain the authority of the UN, the Gatt, of Nato, etc. but that of the member states and their officials; and it is the behavior of these alone, therefore that considerations of legitimacy are important"* (Betham/Lord 1998: 12).

In contrast to this traditional conception of international legitimacy, which Beetham and Lord themselves consider to be "overdrawn" (ibid.) more recent IR legitimacy literature – in particular its normative variant – has started to shift attention and embraced more thoroughly the relationship between the citizens and international institutions (Steffek 2007: 175; see also Zürn et al. 2007).

This widening of the audience of legitimacy relationships of international institutions does not only take place in normative debates, it can also be observed empirically in international institutions' efforts to gain legitimacy. Representatives of the G8, the EU and the UN constantly present or justify themselves to the wider public. Being aware that an elite consensus is no longer sufficient for the stability of international institutions (for the context of the EU see in particular Hooghe and Marks [2008]) their representatives increasingly engage in external self-legitimation practices. In press conferences, speeches and other public performances they offer arguments and justifications for the political authority of international institutions and thereby actively participate in the construction of legitimacy.

Implicitness and *explicitness* is the second central dimension along which self-legitimations vary. At the core of this dimension is the question of whether the aim of generating legitimacy is stated openly and outright or not. Self-legitimations may be very explicit, e.g. strategy papers dealing openly with the question of how legitimacy can be generated. These self-legitimations often have a verbal nature and are thus amenable to text-analytical research. At other times self-legitimations can be so implicit that they are barely recognizable as a means to influence the legitimation process. In particular, non-verbal efforts by political elites fostering the identification with international institutions and forging certain identity constructions fall into the second category. Here self-legitimations are closely linked to self-representations or self-identifications.

The conceptualization and analysis of very subtle, implicit forms of self-legitimations has been undertaken by Rodney Barker (2001). He basically conceives of self-legitimations as an identity building activity:

> *"The principal way in which people issuing commands are legitimated is by their being identified as special, marked by particular qualities, set apart from other people. When rulers legitimate themselves, they give an account of who they are, in writing, in images, in more or less ceremonial actions and practices. The action both creates and expresses the identity" (Barker 2001: 35).*

Following Barker, implicit self-legitimations have a constitutive function. These practices basically constitute the identity of the legitimator, making authority possible in the first place (ibid.: 112). In his conceptualization of self-legitimations, the analysis of routinized behavior such as private or public rites, rituals and ceremonies take center stage (see also Hurd 2008: 48-60) – all of which fulfill the function of confirming the identity of authority.

Explicit self-legitimations – i.e. the verbal often strategic activities of gaining legitimacy – have already been dealt with by a number of authors. Marc C. Suchman (1995) has, for instance, scrutinized self-legitimations of private companies and proposes a typology of legitimation strategies, private organizations employ to gain, maintain, or repair legitimacy. He suggests paying attention to organizations' "legitimacy management", i.e. the active, purposeful and success-oriented engagement in the cultivation of legitimacy as a viable field of study. In a similar vein, political scientists such as David Easton have also extensively dealt with means and measures political institutions might employ to deal with stress in terms of erosion of political support (Easton 1979: 247-341, see also Mayntz 1975), and suggest to study the "deliberate and calculated actions on the part of political leadership or some segment of the authorities to meet the conditions conducing to stress" (Easton 1979: 247). For the international sphere this field of study has still to be disclosed. There are only few authors, who engage in an analysis of explicit self-legitimations of international institutions (e.g. Black 2008). Only the European Union's practices of legitimacy generation have already attracted the attention of some influential scholars (see, for instance, Featherstone 1994; Shore 2000; Wallace/Smith 1995). In sum, the analytical differentiations made above can be summarized in the typology shown in table 1.

Self-legitimations may be *internal and implicit*. These types of self-legitimations are particularly difficult to study. First, because they are so discreet that they might not immediately be recognizable as instances to influence the legitimation process and second because they take place in a small circle of political elites within international institutions. Prime examples for these subtle practices of self-legitimations are the presents distributed by the rotating presidency of the G8/G20-summits to national delegations. The-

se presents vary annually and include rather common artifacts such as ball-point pens, bags, maps and rain jackets and more extraordinary ones such as ashtrays and pencil holders given to the heads of state and government in 1981 in Ottawa – all of which are decorated with special engravings showing a G8/G20 logo (Gronau 2010b). This habit of distributing presents can be conceived of as an identity-confirming measure, making the heads of government and state aware of belonging to the exclusive club of the G8/G20.

Table 1: Typology of Self-Legitimations

	Implicit	**Explicit**
Internal	*Self-identifications* Internal routines, ceremonies and rituals Examples: G8/G20 presents distributed to national and media delegations	*Legitimation strategies/policies* communication policy, public relations strategy paper, institutional reform plans Examples: EU Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate
External	*Self-representations* Public routines, ceremonies and rituals, Examples: G8, EU, UN summit family photos	*Self-justifications* press conferences and other public statements in which political elites offer justifications of their institutions Examples: G8 Accountability Report

Implicit self-legitimation can be displayed publicly and might therefore also be *external*. Here self-legitimations often take the form of self-representations; most obviously the authorized "family photos" taken during the G8 and EU summits, which are afterwards reproduced extensively in the media, where they reach a larger audience. These "family photos rituals" are examples of implicit and external self-legitimations which facilitate certain identity constructions of the respective institution and their representatives and offer instances of identification both for the heads of state and government themselves as well as for the wider public.

Furthermore, self-legitimations may take the form of *explicit* considerations of how legitimacy can be gained and may materialize in communication policy and public relations strategy papers, institutional reform plans or any other document produced by international institutions addressed to the closer circle of officials, dealing explicitly with the question of how legitimacy can be generated. These documents constitute examples of *internal* forms of self-legitimations when they are pieces of intra-organizational communication, i.e. when officials from national governments or the secretariat of the international institution are the primary addressees.

Our own research on the legitimation strategies of the EU has revealed that there are indeed an abundance of internal documents in which the EU institutions explicitly deal with the question of how legitimacy can be gained (Biegoń 2011). This is not only true for the EU but also for other international institutions. A significant example is constitu-

ted by the reform plans different international institutions implemented in the last decades in order to improve civil society participation (Liese 2009) and accountability as well as transparency regimes (Barnett 1997) – most of which are direct reactions to falling levels of political support.

Finally, self-legitimations may be *explicit* and *external*. Here, self-legitimations take the form of public statements in which representatives of international institutions offer justifications for their institutions. Public justifications for international institutions can be voiced in press conferences, speeches, interviews etc. and they reach a particularly wide audience if they are taken up by the media. Focusing on these self-legitimations pays tribute to the communicative dimension of legitimation processes. In various previous publications we have outlined the pivotal role that language and communication play in the (re-)production and transformation of legitimacy (Schneider et al. 2010; Nullmeier et al. 2010, see also Steffek 2003 and Reus-Smit 2007: 163). According to this research perspective, the successful reproduction of legitimacy is dependent on processes of political communication in which political elites need to "justify their own authority – as well as the basic principles of the regimes and institutions they represent – and in doing so they have to provide citizens with normatively acceptable reasons for the compliance that is expected of them" (Schneider et al. 2010: 33).

4. EXPLICIT EXTERNAL SELF-LEGITIMATION OF THREE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The empirical section of the paper exemplifies the applicability of our conceptual framework by an analysis of explicit external communicative acts of self-legitimation uttered by representatives of three major international institutions: the European Union (EU), the Group of Eight (G8) and the United Nations (UN). Hence, it is no attempt to provide an empirical analysis of the entire field of self-legitimation strategies presented in the previous section but limited to one possible way of exploring self-legitimation strategies situated in the lower-right box of our two by two matrix.

4.1. Methods and Data

The inquiry draws on a large corpus of newspaper articles each of which contains at least one statement dealing with the legitimacy of the selected international institutions. The choice of international institutions is based on the hypothesis that organizations with varying opportunity structures in terms of staff and budget can be expected to apply different self-legitimation strategies because the chances of actors to become visible in the public and especially in the media depend on their capacities and their actual influence (Koopmans et al. 2010). Hence, we picked empirically relevant international

governance arrangements with a high budget, large staff, and strong political influence (the EU) (Robinson 2009; Trondal 2010) and international institutions that have basically no money at their disposal and operate on the basis of very few employees or depend like the G8 on a workforce provided by national bureaucracies (Hajnal 2007). The UN was chosen to represent a middle ground in this respect (Weiss/Daws 2007).

The rational for choosing articles from quality newspapers instead of, for instance, television news coverage, tabloid papers, or documents published by the selected institutions themselves is twofold: First, we argue that – by definition – external (self-)legitimation statements can only be assumed to be influential if they are highly visible in the public (Koopmans 2007: 183). Media discourses satisfy this criterion and are, thus, a crucial element of processes of (self-)legitimation. These discourses contribute to shaping the legitimacy beliefs and behavioral dispositions of citizens. Hence, the media constitutes the discursive forum which displays our object of study in a most intense form. Secondly, we recognize the prominent role of the *quality press* in Western democracies. While other news outlets such as television or tabloid papers are, of course, important media outlets, we argue that the quality press functions as the strongest transmission belt and gatekeeper between the political system and its citizens. As this transmission function lies at the core of the interactive understanding of legitimation presented in this paper, we consider our focus on quality newspapers warranted. The sample is furthermore narrowed down to two opinion leading quality newspapers – representing the (center-)right and (center-)left,[5] from Switzerland, Germany, Great Britain and the United States over a time span of ten years (1998-2007). Our sample of four Western democracies was chosen to provide for some representativeness in terms of political- and media cultures and institutional arrangements.

We coded individual statements that evaluate the legitimacy of the selected international institutions. These evaluations were operationalized as quasi-sentences (Klingemann et al. 2006; Koopmans/Statham 1999) that can be identified and described with the help of a stylized legitimation "grammar" (Table 2). This grammar is constituted by three key variables: the assessed legitimation object, the positive (legitimizing) or negative (delegitimizing) evaluative character of the statement, and the normative criterion (pattern of legitimation) on which it is based.

This methodology of political valuation analysis (Schmidtke/Nullmeier 2011) can also be applied to other text corpora, such as manifestos, strategy papers, debates, and other strategic communicative acts, produced by international institutions and their rep-

---

[5]   Times and Guardian for Britain, Washington Post and New York Times for the United States, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung for Germany, and Neue Zürcher Zeitung and Tagesanzeiger for Switzerland.

resentatives and therefore provides a toolkit that is particularly suitable for further empirical analyses of external communicative acts of self-legitimation.

As a census analysis for two newspapers in four countries over a time span of ten years implies massive workload a sampling strategy reducing this effort was applied. Following the notion of *intensity sampling*[6] data analysis was limited to time periods of high public attention. Regarding international institutions this condition is best fulfilled by the annual summits of the selected organization (Couldry et al. 2010). One summit per organization and year was selected. Articles containing relevant statements were retrieved for a time frame of ten days around the summits.

Table 2: Legitimation Grammar and Examples

Example 1: "The European democratic deficit is not only a matter of secretive or unresponsive leaders but of muddled and unrealistic citizens, and both must change their ways if Europe is to find a way out of its troubles." (*Guardian*, 20/06/2005)			
The EU …	is illegitimate …	because it is …	1. undemocratic 2. intransparent. 3. unaccountable
Example 2: "Tony Blair, who is to host the G8 in 2005, also defended what he said was the value of summits in focusing minds and setting the lead for the world economy." (*Times*, 04/06/2003)			
The G8 …	is legitimate …	because of its…	charismatic leadership.
Example 3: "Mr. Annan's office took the unusual step of releasing his remarks last night to underscore his caution that there is "no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations." (*New York Times*, 12/09/2002)			
The UN …	is legitimate …		

4.2.   Empirical Findings – Your Majesty, famed is thy legitimacy![7]

Based on our dataset of 5456 legitimation propositions we explore public self-legitimation statements of genuine representatives of the EU, G8, and UN, such as the head of the European Commission, the UN secretary general or the head of a G8 summit, and national representatives of respective member states, such as the British Prime Minister or the German Chancellor, which we assume to be the central self-legitimizers of international institutions. In the case of the G8 and the EU these two groups are not

---

[6]   Patton (2002) defines this method as the selection of information-rich cases that manifest the phenomena of interest intensely.

[7]   As the title of the paper this phrase refers to the famous fairy tale by the Brothers Grimm. In the story of "Snow White and the seven Dwarfs" each day the Queen and stepmother of Snow White consults her Magic Mirror. "What wouldst thou know, my Queen?" The Queen asks her Magic Mirror the famous question: Magic Mirror on the wall, Who is the fairest one of all? The Magic Mirror cannot lie, and must admit that there is someone else other than the Queen who is the fairest in the land.

perfectly distinct. Hence, we double attribute representatives of national governments if they hold the rotating position as chair of a G8 summit or as the presidency of the Council of the European Union as both representative of the G8/EU and a national politician[8]. Furthermore we controlled for the origin of speakers and coded only those as national politicians that originate from member states of the selected organizations[9]. The corpus is, however, not limited to these speakers so that we are able to compare communicative legitimation strategies of representatives of international institutions to the entire legitimation discourse shaped by additional groups of speakers, such as journalists, civil society representatives, and economic actors.

In the following, we focus on a comparative analysis of self-legitimation strategies and exclude possible developments over time. Although variance over time is a relevant issue as well, the main focus here is on variation across organizations and groups of speakers. Subsequent to an overview of our data, it is shown that compared to other speaker groups, both groups of potential self-legitimizers have indeed a clear tendency to legitimize their respective international institutions. A more detailed inquiry of particular arguments used for public external self-legitimation statements presented in the remainder of the sections seems to suggest that although our selected organizations do not only vary in terms of staff and budget but are also different with respect to policy areas and political authority, their representatives use similar arguments in their legitimacy claims.

Legitimacy Discourses

As our theoretical framework suggests, public legitimacy discourses on international institutions are not solely populated by civil society speakers, ordinary persons and other non-state actors (here subsumed under the category of other speakers) but representatives of international institutions themselves and speakers of member states play a role as well. In all three debates on the selected institutions representatives make use of mass media communication and evaluate the legitimacy of their respective organizations to a considerable extent. As we assume that these statements are influential in shaping general understandings of legitimacy it can be noted that – in line with our propositions – processes of legitimation can by no means be considered to be purely bottom-up. The discursive legitimation of international governance arrangements and other political regimes is rather an alternating process of de- and re-legitimation borne by both rulers and subjects.

---

[8]   Hence the number of statements considered changes to 5558.

[9]   Although Switzerland became only a full member of the UN in 2002, we decided to include its national politicians because Switzerland is affiliated to the UN in various ways since the formation of the organization.

Figure 1: Legitimacy Statements per Speaker Group and Organization

Note: The width of the column shows the relative distribution of statements across international institutions. The white and grayish parts indicate the distribution of statements across speakers in the respective institution.

While this observation holds in general for all three governance arrangements, Figure 1 points also to considerable variance across speaker groups and organizations. Regarding the latter, the figure displays that contributions of G8 representatives are less frequent (12.5 percent of all statements on the G8) than for the EU (27.9 percent of all statements on the EU) and the UN (48.4 percent of all statements on the UN). The modest impact of G8-representatives seems to be in line with our hypothesis on the positive relationship between international institutions' capacities and the amount of self-legitimation statements. However, this picture is distorted by the strong presence of UN-speakers that outnumber the utterances of EU-spokespersons by more than twenty percent although the latter disposes by far of the most resources. With almost half of all UN-related propositions, speakers representing the UN dominate the entire debate and play a significantly more important role than, for instance, civil society speakers, whose statements amount only to 16.3 percent of all legitimacy propositions referring to the UN.

In terms of variance across speaker groups we observe a similar pattern for all three organizations. National politicians seem to be more active or better equipped to become more active in the field of self-legitimation than the organization's genuine spokespersons. This effect is most pronounced in the case of the G8 and the UN where the ratio of representatives of international institutions to national politicians is almost one to three or one to two respectively. Activities of EU-representatives, on the other hand, are more balanced as the difference amounts only to five percent between both groups.

In sum, this overview helps to demonstrate that representatives of international institutions do, indeed, actively participate in legitimation discourses and are, thus, strongly involved in shaping the verdict of the 'mirror of legitimacy'. Furthermore, our comparison across speaker groups and organizations seems to imply that not all organizations are equally well equipped to pursue this activity. While the UN seems to be very effective in influencing public legitimacy debates, we observe a less strong impact of the EU and especially the G8. As political and financial capacity cannot account fully for this result further research on the question of why some organizations are more influential than others is needed.

Level of Self-Legitimation

So far our analysis included both negative and positive legitimation propositions. As the focus of the present paper is, however, on self-legitimation, we now turn attention to statements with a positive evaluative thrust. In this respect, we expect that both spokespersons of international institutions and member state governments argue predominantly in favor of the legitimacy of their respective organizations, i.e. engage in self-legitimation. Figure 2, however, displays a more nuanced pattern. The share of positive statements varies across organizations and – to a lesser extent though – across speaker groups. While G8 spokespersons (92.9 percent) and member state representatives (73.2 percent) fulfill our basic expectation of utterly positive evaluations of their organization, this is barely the case for the EU discourse and can only be confirmed to some extent for the UN debate. Most surprising are the results for the representatives of the EU and its member state governments. Neither of the two groups achieves a minimum of fifty percent of positive evaluations, which implies that in more than half of all cases representatives of the European Union and its member states question the legitimacy of this organization or one of its major components.

Although the results for the UN are not so much different, it can be noted that, after all, national politicians (55.4 percent) utter self-legitimizing evaluations more often than not. Its genuine representatives such as the Secretary General, on the other hand, seem to be rather less convinced (47.8 percent).

Although, the results for the EU and the UN are not fully in line with our expectations, it can still be noted that representatives of all three organizations evaluate the legitimacy of their respective organizations much more favorably than other speakers. In none of our cases does this group exceed the level of twenty percent positive statements and is, thus, less than half as positive as the political representatives of the selected organizations.

This brings us to variance across speaker groups. This aspect assumes only marginal proportions in the case of the EU and the UN. In both legitimacy debates the share of

self-legitimations is almost equal for spokespersons of international institutions and national politicians and only slightly dominated by holders of national political offices.[10] A strong difference is, however, observable in the case of the G8. Not only is the gap between the relevant speaker groups larger than for the other two international institutions (19.6 percent) but the pattern is also reversed implying a stronger self-legitimation role for the heads of G8 summits than for national governments' representatives.

Figure 2:   Share of Positive Legitimation Statements across Organizations and Speakers Groups

We note that although the share of self-legitimizing statements appears to be lower than expected and both groups of representatives of international institutions can by no means be described as pure self-legitimizers our results can still be interpreted as an indicator for the application of self-legitimation strategies by these actors. While other speakers are even more critical and level around a share of twenty percent of positive statements, representatives of international institutions contribute substantially to the presentation of positive images of their respective institutions. Hence, representatives of international institutions can be considered to be able to influence the 'mirror's' verdict in their favors.

---

[10]   For the EU the share of positive spokespersons of international institutions is 2.1 percent lower than that of government representatives. For the UN this difference amount to 7.6 percent.

Legitimacy Patterns

To delineate more precisely how these positive images are shaped and injected into the discourse on the legitimacy of the selected organization the remainder of the section is devoted to the normative foundations (patterns of legitimation) spokespersons of international institutions and representatives of member state governments evoke in their self-legitimations. (langer Satz!)Hence, this part of the analysis is limited to the share of positive legitimacy statements and excludes the negative ones.[11]

We identified 29 criteria which we assume to constitute potential legitimation patterns of political regimes. These patterns are partly drawn from democratic theory literature and partly inductively extracted from the textual material used for the inquiry at hand (for a complete list see appendix 1). With respect to our theoretical concerns we classify legitimation patterns with the help of a two dimensional typology. The first organizing distinction is provided by Scharpf's (1999) widely accepted distinction between input and output legitimacy. Following this thought legitimacy propositions can either discuss the quality of a decision making process or its results. While statements of the first type are considered to fall into the input category, we classify the latter as output-related.

The second distinction builds on the idea that legitimacy claims may either refer to democracy-based criteria such as popular sovereignty or to non-democracy-related issues such as the effectiveness of political regimes. The distinction between democracy-based and non-democracy-based criteria builds on an undemanding definition of democracy offered, for instance, by Schattschneider: "*Democracy is a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process.*" (Schattschneider 1960: 138). This definition leaves enough room to include a variety of input and output aspects of an institution that can be relevant for the existence of such a system. Evaluation criteria pointing to these aspects are classified as democracy-based, whereas arguments referring to elements not essential – though not necessarily antithetical – to a democratic system of governance are classified as non-democracy-based (Hurrelmann et al. 2005: 123).

These distinctions result in four categories of legitimation patterns: democracy-based input (DI), democracy-based output (DO), non-democracy-based input (NDI), and non-democracy-based output (NDO). In addition we introduce a fifth group of general valuations that do not make use of an explicit criterion or refer to other rather peculiar arguments that do not fit the typology. In this category, we group statements like "there is

---

[11] n=1444

no alternative to the United Nations" (*Guardian*, 24/09/2003), or "demonstrations against the illegitimate G8" (*Times*, 02/06/2003).

Figure 3: Frequency Distribution of Positive Statements across Legitimation Patterns

Note: The width of the column shows the relative distribution of statements across speaker groups. The white and grayish parts indicate the distribution of statements across speakers in the respective IO.

Figure 3 displays the distribution of positive legitimation statements across speaker groups and legitimation patterns for the three selected governance arrangements. At first glance it can be observed that similar to the group of other speakers both spokespersons of international institutions and national government representatives of all three international institutions make use – to a varying degree though – of all five groups of legitimation patterns. It seems, therefore, that self-legitimizers try to cater their strategies to a broad variety of possible criticisms.

On the other hand, it has to be taken into account that the distribution of legitimating propositions is in all three debates dominated by non-democracy-based criteria. In this vein, for instance José Manuel Barroso takes up the opportunity to legitimize the European Union by characterizing it as "[…] a uniquely effective instrument for helping the UK and other European countries to develop solutions to […] new, cross-border challenges." For him "[…] this is the EU's raison d'être for the 21st century: to help Europeans prosper in a globalized world" (both *Guardian,* 18/10/2006). The same is true for the G8 and the UN where we also discover a variety of similar statements, for in-

stance,hailing the "substantial progress" the G8's 2005 Africa package implied (Blair in *Guardian*, 09/072005) or former US president Bush praising the effectiveness of the UN by pointing out that "[…] the world works better when we act together" (*Washington Post*, 24/09/2005). As all three organizations can be assumed to have a rather weak democratic flank, this special attention to non-democracy-based criteria is striking. Self-legitimizers of all three organizations seem to focus especially on propositions highlighting the particular strength of their organizations rather than tackling the more problematic aspects of their legitimacy. This issue becomes even more apparent regarding the category of general legitimacy propositions. For both organizations; the UN and the G8, these particular legitimation patterns, by which legitimacy is claimed without any reference to a normative foundation, make up more than one third of the entire set of self-legitimating statements. An example of these contributions is provided by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan who repeatedly evokes "[…] the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations" (*New York Times*, 24/09/2003). While EU-representatives seem to have realized that the legitimacy of their organization is truly precarious and that general assurances of the EU's invulnerable legitimacy are no longer enough in times of the 'constraining dissensus' (Hooghe/Marks 2008), representatives of both the UN and the G8 still stick to this idea. They do not support their positive evaluations argumentatively in more than one third of the cases. This result seems to imply that the rising societal politicization did so far not sink into their minds. Although societal demands and public criticisms are concerned with particular aspects of both organizations, their representatives quite often do not feel compelled to seriously take up these concerns in their public external legitimation strategies.

In sum, the inquiry of legitimation patterns reveals, on the one hand, a profound diversity of self-legitimation strategies applied by representatives of all three selected international institutions. On the other hand, we also discover the dominance of patterns that aim to highlight the perceived strength of international institutions namely their pareto-optimizing functions, which we often find in IR textbooks (Beetham/Lord 1998: 12). Furthermore, the large share of general and unsupported positive evaluations in the context of the EU and the G8 is striking because it seems to indicate some missing sensitivity for the precarious legitimacy of these two organizations.

5. CONCLUSION

Our empirical findings demonstrate that international institutions' formal representatives and member states actively take part in the process of legitimation. Hence, international governance arrangements are not only objects of legitimacy demands, but at the same time cultivators of their own legitimacy. By answering the questions of whether and how international institutions and its representatives actively claim legitimacy, this

paper addressed two issues: First, we introduced a top-down perspective on the empirical legitimation of international institutions by presenting our *concept of self-legitimation* of political institutions and its representatives. At the core of the concept is the idea that self-legitimations are not only cheap talk or simple rhetorical means, but rather influence the modes of obedience and the authority of international institutions. We proposed that the field of possible self-legitimations can be divided into at least two dimensions, external vs. internal and explicit vs. implicit self-legitimation.

Second, we exemplified this top-down perspective on legitimation – which stands in sharp contrast to traditional research focusing on the "demos" (national level) or the nation state (international level) – by an analysis of media debates on the perceived legitimacy of the G8, the EU, and the UN. This allowed us to examine one of the four introduced varieties, the explicit external self-legitimation of representatives of international institutions and member states.

In particular, our empirical findings indicate that UN-legitimators were the most visible speakers in the analyzed quality press, followed by those of the EU and the less active G8. Most of the representatives of all three international institutions tend to present themselves in a more favorable light if compared to the evaluations of other actors presented in the media. It seems that different from the Magic Mirror in the fairy tale of Snow White the mirror of international institutions are able to lie when they are consulted by representatives of international institutions. Concerning the criteria used to evaluate the analyzed institutions, representatives of international institutions and member states more often rely on traditional benchmarks which have for a long time dominated IR literature, such as performance and efficiency criteria. While those output-related criteria dominate the field of external explicit self-legitimations, especially representatives of the UN and the G8 complement their set of criteria by simply claiming legitimacy without reference to any normative benchmark. In contrast to the general focus on the output of institutions taken by representatives of international institutions, those speakers representing civil society challenged the G8, the EU, and the UN by focusing on the more problematic aspects of democratic legitimacy, such as transparency and representativeness. In sum, we can observe that the normative benchmarks employed to evaluate international institutions significantly vary between their representatives and member state governments and other actors.

Our analysis of external explicit self-legitimation provides a comprehensive picture of processes of international legitimation. More research is needed to clarify the mutual impact of self-legitimations and evaluations by other actors. How do the two perspectives within the process of legitimation, top-down and bottom-up, relate to each other and how are they interconnected over time? Equally left for future research are the self-legitimizing activities of international institutions in those fields of our matrix we were

not able to refer to in this paper, e.g. by analyzing declarations and artifacts of international institutions and interviewing those persons in authority who are responsible for self-legitimation strategies.

APPENDIX *- 22 -*

Appendix 1: Legitimacy Patterns

	democracy-based	non-democracy-based
input	– popular sovereignty participation – deliberation – transparency – accountability – legality – credibility – demos/community	– (charismatic) leadership – expertocratic leadership – religious authority – traditional processes – moderation – capability/agency – seriousness
output	– protection of human rights – reversibility – democratic empowerment – contribution to public good	– efficacy/effectiveness – efficiency – distributive justice – contribution to stability – contribution to identity – contribution to morality – sovereignty/power – good international standing – innovation – relevancy/good agenda

REFERENCES

Barker, Rodney. 2001. *Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barker, Rodney. 2003. Legitimacy, Legitimation, and the European Union: What Crisis? In *Law and Administration in Europe. Essays in Honour of Carol Harlow*, ed. Paul Craig/Richard Rawlings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 157-174.

Barker, Rodney. 2007. Democratic Legitimation. What Is It, Who Wants It, and Why? In *Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics*, ed. Achim Hurrelmann/Steffen Schneider/Jens Steffek. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 19-34.

Barnett, Michael. 1997. Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations. In *World Politics* 49 (4), 526-551.

Beetham, David/Lord, Christopher. 1998. *Legitimacy and the European Union*. London: Longham.

Bernstein, Steven. 2005. Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance. In *Journal of International Law and International Relations* 1 (1-2), 139-166.

Biegoń, Dominika. 2010. Die Europäische Union zwischen Effektivität und Demokratie. In *Prekäre Legitimitäten. Rechtfertigung von Herrschaft in der postnationalen Konstellation,* ed. Frank Nullmeier/Dominika Biegoń/Jennifer Gronau/Martin Nonhoff/Henning Schmidtke/Steffen Schneider. Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 186-221.

Biegoń, Dominika. 2011. Die Europäische Kommission auf der Suche nach Legitimität. In *Paper presented at the Dreiländertagung*, University of Basel, 13/14 January 2011.

Black, Julia. 2008. Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes. In *Regulation & Governance* 2 (2), 137-164.

Brock, Lothar. 2007. Zauberlehrlinge, oder: Die List der (Un-)Vernunft in den internationalen Beziehungen. Eine Replik auf Zürn et al. In *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 14 (1), 165-174.

Buchanan, Allen. 2011. Reciprocal Legitimation: Refraiming the Problem of International Legitimacy. In *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 10 (1), 5-19.

Buchanan, Allen/Keohane, Robert O. 2006. The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions. In *Ethics & International Affairs* 20 (4), 405-433.

Christiano, Thomas. 2011. Introduction to Symposium on Ethical Dimensions of International Institutions. In *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 10 (1), 3-4.

Clark, Ian. 2005. *Legitimacy in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clark, Ian. 2007. Legitimacy in International or World Society. In *Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics,* ed. Achim Hurrelmann/Steffen Schneider/Jens Steffek. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 193-210.

Claude, Inis L. 1966. Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations. In *International Organization* 20 (3), 367-379.

Couldry, Nick/Hepp, Andreas/Krotz, Friedrich, ed. 2010. *Media Events in a Global Age.* London: Routledge.

Cronin, Bruce/Hurd, Ian, ed. 2008. *The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority.* New York: Roudledge.

Dingwerth, Klaus. 2011. Von der internationalen Politik zum globalen Regieren. In *Paper presented at the Dreiländertagung*, University of Basel, 13/14 January 2011.

Easton, David. 1975. A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support. In *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (4), 435-457.

Easton, David. 1979. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life.* 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ecker-Ehrhardt, Matthias/Zürn, Michael. 2007. Die Politisierung internationaler Organisationen. In *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (20-21), 24-30.

Featherstone, Kevin. 1994. Jean Monnet and the "Democratic Deficit" in the European Union. In *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32 (2), 149-170.

Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule. How States Win and Lose Legitimacy.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Gronau, Jennifer. 2010a. Die G8. Wirkungsloses Spektakel oder mächtiger Club der Reichen? In *Prekäre Legitimitäten. Rechtfertigung von Herrschaft in der postnationalen Konstellation,* ed. Frank Nullmeier/Dominika Biegoń/Jennifer Gronau/Martin Nonhoff/Henning Schmidtke/Steffen Schneider. Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 147-185.

Gronau, Jennifer. 2010b. *G7/G8 Artifacts and the Politics of Self-Representation.* http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/gronau-artifacts.pdf.

Gronau, Jennifer/Nonhoff, Martin/Nullmeier, Frank/Schneider, Steffen. 2009. Spiele ohne Brot? Die Legitimationskrise der G8. In *Leviathan* 37 (1), 117-143.

Hajnal, Peter I.. 2007. *The G8 System and the G20. Evolution, Role and Documentation.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Halliday, Terence C./Block-Lieb, Susan/Carruthers, Bruce G. 2010. Global Scripts as Strategic Devices of International Organizations. In *Socio-Economic Review* 8 (1), 77-112.

Hix, Simon. 2008. *What's Wrong with the European Union and how to Fix it.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hooghe, Liesbet/Marks, Gary. 2008. A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. In *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1), 1-23.

Hurd, Ian. 1999. Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. In *International Organization* 53 (2), 379-408.

Hurd, Ian. 2008. Myths of Membership. The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform. In *Global Governance* 14 (2), 199-217.

Hurrelmann, Achim/Krell-Laluhová, Zuzana/Lhotta, Roland/Nullmeier, Frank/Schneider, Steffen. 2005. Is there a Legitimation Crisis of the Nation State? In *Transformation of the State?,* ed. Stephan Leibfried/Michael Zürn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 119-137.

Hurrelmann, Achim/Schneider, Steffen/Steffek, Jens. 2007. Introduction. Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics. In *Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics,* ed. Achim Hurrelmann/Steffen Schneider/Jens Steffek. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1-18.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter/Volkens, Andrea/Bara, Judith/Budge, Ian/Macdobald, Michael, ed. 2006. *Mapping Policy Preferences II Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Koopmans, Ruud. 2007. Who Inhabits the European Public Sphere? Winners and Losers, Supporters and Opponents in Europeanised Political Debates. In *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (2), 183-210.

Koopmans, Ruud/Erbe, Jessica/Meyer, Martin F.. 2010. The Europeanization of Public Spheres: Comparison across Issues, Time, and Countries. In *The Making of a European Public Sphere*, ed. Ruud Koopmans/Paul Statham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 63-96.

Koopmans, Ruud/Statham, Paul. 1999. Political Claims Analysis: Integrating Protest, Event and Political Discourse Approaches. In *Mobilization* 4 (2), 203-221.

Liese, Andrea. 2009. Die unterschiedlich starke Öffnung internationaler Organisationen gegenüber nicht-staatliche Akteuren. Erklärungen der Institutionen- und Organisationstheorie. In *Die organisierte Welt. Internationale Beziehungen und* Organisationsforschung, ed. Klaus Dingwerth/Dieter Kerwer/Andreas Nölke. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 189-210.

Mayntz, Renate. 1975. Legitimacy and the Directive Capacity of the Political System. In *Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism - Public Policy and the Theory of the State,* ed. Leon N. Lindberg/Robert Alford/Colin Crouch/Claus Offe. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 261-274.

Merquior, José Guilherme. 1980. *Rousseau and Weber. Two Studies in the Theory of Legitimacy*. London: Routledge.

Morris, Justin/Wheeler, Nicholas. 2007. The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force. In *International Politics* 44 (2), 214-231.

Nanz, Patrizia/Steffek, Jens (2004): Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere. In *Government and Opposition* 39 (2), 314-335.

Nölke, Andreas. 2007. Für eine politische Theorie politischer Ordnungsbildung jenseits des Nationalstaats. Eine Replik auf Zürn et al. In *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 14 (1), 191-200.

Nonhoff, Martin/Gronau, Jennifer/Nullmeier, Frank/Schneider, Steffen. 2009. Zur Politisierung internationaler Institutionen. Der Fall G8. In *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 16 (2), 237-268.

Nullmeier, Frank/Biegoń, Dominika/Gronau, Jennifer/Nonhoff, Martin/Schneider, Steffen/Schmidtke, Henning. 2010. *Prekäre Legitimitäten: Rechtfertigung von Herrschaft in der postnationalen Konstellation*. Frankfurt/Main: Campus.

Patton, Michael Q. 2002. *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*. Newbury Park: Sage.

Quack, Sigrid. 2010. Law, Expertise and Legitimacy in Transnational Economic Governance: An Introduction. In *Socio-Economic Review* (8), 3-16.

Reus-Smit, Christian. 2007. International Crisis of Legitimacy. In *International Politics* 44 (2), 157-174.

Rigby, Thomas Henry/Fehér, Ferenc. 1982. *Political Legitimation in Communist States.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Robinson, Nick. 2009. The European Investment Bank. The EU's neglected Institution. In *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38 (3), 519-538.

Saward, Michael. 2006. The Representative Claim. In *Contemporary Political Theory* 5 (3), 297-318.

Saward, Michael. 2010. *The Representative Claim.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schmidtke, Henning. 2010. Die Vereinten Nationen - gespaltene Legitimität. In *Prekäre Legitimitäten: Rechtfertigung von Herrschaft in der postnationalen Konstellation,* ed. Frank Nullmeier/Dominika Biegoń/Jennifer Gronau/Martin Nonhoff/Steffen Schneider/Henning Schmidtke. Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 107-146.

Schmidtke, Henning. 2011. Is there a Trend towards to Politicization of International Institutions? Empirical Evidence from three Major Arenas of Global Governance. In *Paper presented at ISA International Conference*, Montreal, 16-19 March 2011.

Schmidtke, Henning/Nullmeier, Frank. 2011. Political Valuation Analysis and the Legitimacy of International Organizations. In *German Policy Studies* 7 (3), 117-153.

Schneider, Steffen/Hurrelmann, Achim/Krell-Laluhová, Zuzana/Nullmeier, Frank/Wiesner, Achim. 2010. *Democracy's Deep Roots. Why the nation State Remains Legitimate.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Seabrocke, Leonard. 2007. Legitimacy Gaps in the World Economy: Explaining the Sources of the IMF's Legitimacy Crisis. In *International Politics* 44 (2), 250-268.

Shore, Cris. 2000. *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration.* London: Routledge.

Steffek, Jens. 2003. The Legitimation of International Governance. A Discourse Approach. In *European Journal of International Relations* 9 (2), 249-275.

Steffek, Jens. 2007. Legitimacy in the International Relations: From State Compliance to Citizen Consensus. In *Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics,* ed. Achim Hurrelmann/Steffen Schneider/Jens Steffek. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 175-192.

Suchman, Mark C. 1995. Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. In *The Academy of Management Review* 20 (3), 571-610.

Thomassen, Jaques, ed. 2009. *The Legitimacy of the European Union After Enlargement.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Trondal, Jarle. 2010. *An Emergent European Executive Order.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wallace, William/Smith, Julie. 1995. Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the Problem of Popular Consent. In *West European Politics* 18 (3), 137-157.

Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weiss, Thomas/Daws, Sam, ed. 2007. *Oxford Handbook on the United Nations.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wiener, Antje. 2009. Das Normative in der Internationalen Politik: Unsichtbare Konsequenzen von Institutionenbildung? Eine Replik auf Zürn et al. In Zeitschrift für *Internationale Beziehungen* 14 (1), 183-189.

Zürn, Michael. 2004. Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems. In *Government and Opposition* 39 (2), 260-287.

Zürn, Michael. 2006. Zur Politisierung der Europäischen Union. In *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 47 (2), 242-251.

Zürn, Michael/Binder, Martin/Ecker-Ehrhardt, Matthias/Radtke, Katrin. 2007. Politische Ordnungsbildung wider Willen. In *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 14 (1), 129-164.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Dominika Biegoń is research fellow at the Collaborative Research Center "Transformations of the State", University of Bremen.

Telephone:	+49 421 218 56651
Fax:	+49 421 218-56633
E-Mail:	dominika.biegon@sfb597.uni-bremen.de
Address:	University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center "Transformations of the State", Linzer Straße 9a, D 28359 Bremen

Jennifer Gronau is research fellow at the Collaborative Research Center "Transformations of the State", University of Bremen.

Telephone:	+49 421 218 56652
Fax:	+49 421 218-56633
E-Mail:	jennifer.gronau@sfb597.uni-bremen.de
Address:	University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center "Transformations of the State", Linzer Straße 9a, D 28359 Bremen

Henning Schmidtke is research fellow at the Collaborative Research Center "Transformations of the State", University of Bremen.

Telephone:	+49 421 218 56634
Fax:	+49 421 218-56633
E-Mail:	henning.schmidtke@sfb597.uni-bremen.de
Address:	University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center "Transformations of the State", Linzer Straße 9a, D 28359 Bremen