

## **Project D2:**

# **The Internationalization of the “Monopoly of the Legitimate Use of Force”**

Overview and Research Plan, October 2002

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## **Project Summary**

“The monopoly of the legitimate use of force” (Max Weber), embodied in the police and the military, is one of the classic characteristics of the state. For many it is in fact the very definition of modern statehood. While the trend to transfer competences to the international sphere can be observed in many other policy areas, in the OECD-world the decision to employ force still seems to belong exclusively to nation states.

This is not, however, the whole picture. Since the “golden age” of the DCIS (Democratic Constitutional and Interventionist State) the nature of the conflicts in which the police and the military have been employed have changed in scope and type. One can also observe a trans- and internationalization of the “problem situations” themselves. As a result, one can assume that not only in the sphere of welfare but also in the domains of security and rule a network of international institutions has developed that have both inter- and supranational elements. It is likely that the extent to which this has occurred depends on the kind of problem and the institutional arrangements involved. The actual use of force, therefore, may have become dependent on “external” – as opposed to internal, i.e. domestic – norms and rules, and a *de facto* interdependence may have developed. If this is the case, it means that states are actively submitting their unrestrained disposal over the use of force to external influences and processes of legitimation. This would amount to an internationalization of the state in the dimension of resources.

Comparing the 1970s with the 1990s, the following areas will be investigated: *war between states, civil war, transnational terrorism and transnational crime*. *First* of all we will examine exactly where and in what form nation states have been prepared to leave tasks over to international institutions for supervision or for actual steering and handling. What are state preferences concerning the internationalization of the monopoly of the legitimate use of force? In how far is the nation state’s autonomy *de jure* and/or *de facto* limited as a result? *Second*, for each of the different policy areas involved we will establish the causes for this change – or failure to change. *Third*, we explore whether national identities or structures are transformed in this process and whether these transformations are temporary or permanent.

## **1 Outline of the Research Problem and Review of the Literature**

This component project within the larger collaborative research centre on the transformation of the state (*Sonderforschungsbereich 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“*) is concerned with the emergence, the content and the impact of state preferences with regard to the internationalization of the monopoly of force. In recent years a two-step explanation of international cooperation has found widespread acceptance. In the first step state preferences are explained, and in the second the results of interactions between states based on these preferences (Legro 1996; Moravcsik 1993; cf. Tullock 1962). Research has often been faulted, however, for concentrating on the second step and neglecting the first, the explanation of preferences (cf. Nye 1988: 248).

Even a cursory survey of the relevant literature reveals that there is no universal theory of the formation of state preferences. Rather, there are more or less well developed partial theories, whose scopes of application sometimes complement each other and sometimes overlap. A relatively clear classification that also highlights the problems connected to the central question of this project rests on Czempiel's (1981) suggested distinction between the sphere of welfare on the one hand and those of security and rule on the other.

### **Welfare**

Preference formation in welfare has been better researched, both empirically and theoretically, than it has in the other two fields. The results of the most important studies can be summarized as follows: state preferences are directly determined by the differential pressures of different social groups, which, in turn, depend on the extent to which these groups are impacted by international events (Frieden 1988; Milner 1988; Rogowski 1989; Moravcsik 1998). More affected groups have stronger specific interests and are more willing and able to mobilize. The likelihood that their interests will be represented in state preferences is therefore very high given a relatively pluralistic political system and the absence of equally strong interests opposed to theirs. On the basis of the model sketched here, elegant theoretical explanations can be linked to detailed empirical analysis.

This model cannot, however, be easily applied to Czempiel's other two spheres. This is because at its core it infers subjective preferences from objective conditions (foreign trade interdependence, capital flows, etc.). The reason why actors behave as the theory predicts, based on relatively easily measurable and as a rule readily available objective data, is the existence of a selection mechanism that eliminates "false" preferences (Schmalz-Bruns 1995: 360). This mechanism is the market: if a company or interest group ignores globalization it risks bankruptcy or declining membership. Where there is no market or functional equivalent, one cannot infer subjective preferences from objective conditions. Even in the domain of welfare, however, the relationship between market mechanism and state preferences is indirect: only individual businesses must react to developments in the market, sectoral interest groups, on the other hand, often have heterogeneous memberships with divergent interests, and states are often subject to the influence of interest groups with conflicting agendas, among other factors. Nevertheless, on the whole this form of structural preference deduction works well.

### **Security and Rule**

In the area of security – that is, where the state's monopoly on force is directed toward the outside – there is no functional equivalent of the market (Zürn 1997). Thus, here the recent liberal theory of international politics, which emphasizes the development of state preferences as a condition of inter state interaction, comes up against its limits (Moravcsik 1997). The realist theory of international relations, and particularly Waltz' (1979) structural realism, has argued that the anarchic structure of the international system serves as a functional equivalent to the market. In this view, states can never be certain that other states do not harbor aggressive intentions towards them. Ensuring survival through maximizing military and economic power, and participating in changing alliances to compensate for the power of stronger states (balance of power) are therefore preferences forced on states by objective conditions (security dilemma) via a mediating mechanism (anarchy). Because a monopoly of force is necessary to ensure survival, one can predict that states will not subject their exercise of the monopoly on force to external rules nor give it over to international institutions.

There are two criticisms that can be made of the realist theory of state preferences. The first is that it is not specific enough. International security organizations (Haftendorn and Keck 1997; Haftendorn et al. 1999) exist in a variety of different forms and cannot be reduced to alliances relevant to realism on the one hand and irrelevant institutions on the other. Particularly important here is the distinction between institutions that serve to defend against a potential enemy and those that are directed inwards and geared towards ensuring security among members (*security management organizations*; Wallander and Keohane 1999). In the latter case, all member states agree to place authority over the use of means of force in an international framework and why they do so cannot be explained in the context of a threat-oriented theory. The empirical examples at the centre of this controversy are the postulated evolution of NATO from a defensive to a security management organization (cf., e.g., Wallander 2000) and the strong push, in recent years, to construct a European security and defense policy (Wagner and Hellmann 2002). Realist theory is also unable to explain the reasons behind the participation of states in the increasing number of and increasingly intensive efforts at conflict prevention and intervention under the auspices of the UN (cf., e.g., Doyle et al. 1997; Woodhouse et al. 1998; cf. Component Project D3).

The theoretical question underlying these developments is why states, despite sometimes high financial and domestic political costs and without a clearly identifiable threat or promise of return, are prepared to participate so to such a great extent in multilateral security organizations. Here neither realism nor liberalism can provide satisfying answers as they do not allow one to arrive at “subjective” state preferences in the area of security from the kind of differentiation between objective interests and structures that is both empirically necessary and has been achieved in the area of welfare.

An important branch of the constructivist theory of international relations aims to close the theoretical gap in preference formation. Here the second criticism of political realism comes into play, which holds that the elements that are important for preference formation (anarchy, security dilemma) are not objective or immutably given but socially constructed: „Anarchy is What States Make of It“ (Wendt 1992, 1999; Weldes 1996). The term “constructivism”, however, encompasses a number of theoretical strands that conceptualize preference formation very differently. The basic argument of these is that frames, systems of ideas, identities, culture, norms, role models or discourse are impor-

tant for state preference formation and action (Boekle et al. 2001; Duffield 1999; Jepsen et al. 1996; Kirste and Maull 1996; Kratochwil 2002; Risse 1999, 2000). The relationships between these concepts is often unclear, however, and the result is parallel discussion threads with little mutual influence rather than a real debate.

In fact there is empirical work on security (cf., e.g., the contributions in Katzenstein 1996a; Legro 1995) that seems to contradict the common criticism that constructivism lacks empirical grounding. Some studies of individual states can also be considered broadly constructivist in their inspiration (Heuser 1998; Kier 1997), and theories of government have addressed the question of regime dependent preference formation through the internalization of regime specific norms (Müller 1993). All in all, however, these constitute a patchwork of good case studies that are limited to a narrow empirical area, are concerned with international organizations rather than the transformation of states and state interests, and are not conducive to cumulative gains in knowledge because they have only partially compatible theoretical frameworks.

The vast literature on security policy cannot make up for these deficits. The surveys (e.g., Grosser 1984; Hanrieder 1995) lack the necessary attention to detail. The large number of studies on specific questions, on the other hand, share the same set of deficits from the perspective of the questions guiding this study: they are limited to short time periods or very specific events, are often more concerned with specific political outcomes than with theoretical questions of preference formation, and tend to focus on one country or a single international organization. An example of this is the literature on French cooperation in security policy (Haglund 1991; Gordon 1994; Sauder 1995; Soutou 1996; Seewald 1998; Bloch-Lainé 1999; Meimeth 2002).

The literature is also not conducive to the elaboration of preferences because there is often no clear distinction drawn between international and domestic political bargaining positions, rhetorical explanatory strategies, general aims and objectives, (objective) interests and actual preferences. Thus there is a large amount of material available for empirical analysis but it is difficult if not impossible to integrate it into a theoretical model. What is missing in the literature is a longer-term or comparative study of the emergence, character and impact of state preferences in the area of security. This is all the more surprising because the issue of security is, theoretically and empirically, central to international relations.

Czempiel's third category, rule, has always played a subsidiary role to the two central categories *power* und *plenty* (Viner 1948). This can partly be explained by a certain imprecision in the term. There can be no doubt, however, that it includes the activities of the police and of agencies engaged in the prosecution of criminals. Here, however, the literature is even more sparse than that on security. In general, one has the impression that the social sciences have left the topics of policing and criminal prosecution to legal scholars. There is a series of publications on the relationship between the emergence, responsibilities, and transformations of police forces and the formation of nation states up to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century (Aubert 1979; Baylay 1975; Funk 1986; Knöbl 1998). These are of little use, however, for understanding the situation in the fully developed DCIS. Even comprehensive monographs on the topic of "internal security" are relatively rare (Lange 1999; Lenk and Prätorius 1998).

A lack of theoretically informed studies also characterizes the field of international cooperation in police affairs, such as research on the international police organization Interpol (Anderson 1989; Deflem 2000; Fooner 1989). Especially with respect to cooperation within the EU (Bigo 1992), juridical studies predominate (Hailbronner 1996; Harigs 1998; Baldus 2001; Kämper 2001). Debates about transnational police cooperation seem to have taken place primarily among specialists and in specialized journals (*International Organized Crime, International Criminal Police Review*; cf. Fijnaut and Hermans 1987; Krüger 1994; Risch 1997).

The rapid development of the third pillar of the EU, especially following the discussion about the Schengen regime on the elimination of passport controls between certain EU member states and the Treaty of Amsterdam, stimulated the emergence of a number of studies, but the field remains dominated by edited volumes and articles that describe the current situation in a rapidly developing political field. The perspective is one of theories of integration and not of theories of the state (Bieber and Monar 1995; Monar 1998).

Recent trends, like the development of a relationship between transnational terrorism and transnational crime on the one hand and national security on the other, which partially obscure the apparently clear division of tasks between police and military and therefore the distinction between the internal and external application of the monopoly of force, have been widely discussed among the broader public since September 11,

2001. However, they remain limited to the policy literature within the academic sphere (Williams 1994). While the sociological literature on the emergence of states has recognized the close connection between police and military (Knöbl 1998), the role of police organizations in international peace-keeping operations remains largely unexplored.

## **Conclusion**

There are practically no theoretically informed or systematic empirical studies on state preferences with regard to international police cooperation. One of the few exceptions that deals with preference formation is the work of Katzenstein (1993, 1996b). The large empirical study on EU constitutional policy in Germany, France and Great Britain by Moravcsik (1998) is symptomatic of the unevenness in the research on preference formation in the three domains considered here. Moravcsik offers an empirically comprehensive and theoretically sophisticated analysis of the emergence and impact of the relevant preferences with respect to welfare. In the field of security, however, it becomes evident that current theories of preference formation are unable to address the very complex institutional forms within the EU. In the area of rule, the dearth of good explanatory theories means that state preferences are enumerated rather than explained. Rather than representing a weakness on the part of the author, the unevenness of the book is an accurate representation of the current state of the field.

There is currently no comprehensive empirical analysis, let alone a comparative study, of what individual states really want with respect to the internationalization of the monopoly on power. This deficiency is particularly blatant with respect to preferences regarding police activity, the causes and effects which have only just begun to be investigated. The relevant literature usually carries the implicit assumption of unchallenged statehood. The question of what impact the strong pushes towards internationalization over the last few decades will have on this statehood, which in the generally accepted Weberian tradition is defined by the monopoly of force, remains largely unasked.

## **1.1 Research Program**

### **(Goals, Methods, Research Plan and Timetable)**

#### ***1.1.1 Research Goals***

##### **Research Problematic**

In recent years it has become customary to speak of the European Union as a multi-level system. Behind this lies the idea that the EU can no longer be considered merely an international organization to which member states have delegated decision-making authority on the basis of their preferences and interests; rather, the view is that the EU constitutes a complete political system of which the member states form a part. In this view, membership in a multi-level system of states not only changes the basic conditions for autonomous action by the member states, but also affects their very nature as states. States voluntarily commit themselves to a comprehensive political system that provides rationality criteria (Lepsius 1995, 1997) concerning correct and appropriate action. At the same time they voluntarily form institutions to monitor and sanction violations of the rules.

Early research on Europe already involved intensive and controversial discussions on whether statehood in the EU was in a state of transition (see esp. Haas 1964; Hoffmann 1966). The answer to this question has implications that go far beyond research on Europe in the narrower sense. For international relations theory, it would mean that the realist thesis that anarchy is an inevitable part of the structure of the international system is wrong and would confirm the view of the so-called “English school” that different levels of international socialization are possible (Buzan and Little 2000; Watson 1990). For legal studies, it would open up the possibility of a constitutionalism beyond the state (Pernice 2000; Weiler 1997). Processes of gradual socialization and constitutionalization would vary in intensity depending on the causal factors and general contextual conditions involved. In a very long term perspective, one could term this a civilizing process (Elias 1985, 1988). All of this has implications for empirical and theoretical questions concerning political rule.



A multi-level system of states has up to now mainly been discussed in the field of welfare. This is true, for example, for studies of both the EU and the WTO. If, however, international socialization is to be more than a device to realize benefits through cooperation, then it must extend to states' means of force. This is especially true of the control of affect connected to a civilizing process in Elias' sense. If one could demonstrate a transformation in the use of the monopoly of force, then, in the Weberian tradition, this would be synonymous with a transformation in statehood. This leads to the question of how to define the resulting new type or types of statehood. It is often suggested that something qualitatively new is in the process of being formed. With respect to EU domestic and judicial policy Helen Wallace has, for example, coined the term *intensive transgovernmentalism* (Wallace 2002). Research on Europe and on international relations has also used the artichoke as a metaphor to describe the role of the state, where only the outer leaves are removed. In neither academic nor political debates, however, has the question of what happens when you get through to the heart of the artichoke been aggressively pursued. That is what this project intends to do.

## **Research Questions**

The far-reaching questions posed above represent the theoretical background to this project. In order that the study moves beyond an ultimately fruitless discussion of theoretical principles, it must be strongly anchored in empirical data. The main question guiding this project is, therefore, as follows: To what extent, why and with what consequences are state preferences concerning the form and use of the monopoly of force being transformed? The definition of "monopoly of force" is very strictly limited for the purposes of this project. It concerns only the use of military and police in the narrowest sense. The central question is broken down into three parts:

1. In what areas and within what institutional forms are states prepared to place the use of means of force within an international framework? This involves the empirical examination of the relevant state preferences.
2. How can these preferences be explained? What are the reasons for this transformation or its absence in a given area?

3. What effect do these preferences have? What types of institutions emerge and what are the consequences for international institutions and for state identities and structures? Are these effects permanent? How can the resulting multi-level systems be defined?

Particular emphasis will be placed on the increasing complexity of the exercise of the monopoly of force; that is, on whether, why and with what consequences different forms of internationalization are chosen in certain, in part narrowly bounded areas than in others.

### **Dimensions of Change**

The monopoly of force, like the monopoly of taxation, is by definition exclusive to the state. In the case of the monopoly of force, however, the forms and consequences of a privatization of functions that earlier belonged unequivocally to the responsibilities of the police are already under discussion (Stober and Pitschas 2001). On the periphery of and beyond the OECD-world private armies also play a role that cannot be ignored and appears to be growing. The importance of this development for statehood cannot be denied, but the most important development, qualitatively and quantitatively, for the DCIS at the centre of the OECD-world is internationalization. Because of the strong asymmetry in the dimensions of the transformation, this study will focus on internationalization. This focus is also called for because of the lack of empirical evidence, especially in the field of international police cooperation.

### **Variables and Hypotheses**

There exists no systematic comparative and theoretically driven inventory of the content and transformation of state preferences regarding the internationalization of the monopoly of force. There are also no generally accepted or competing theories of preference formation and preference transformation in this area. Thus, this study must first and foremost be exploratory in nature.

The *dependent variables* are theme-specific preferences for specific political institutions. These will first be systematically ascertained and evaluated along two dimensions. One dimension concerns the topics addressed in this study and the other the institutions within which these topics will be examined.

*Topics:* The substantive area to be examined (cf. “Selection of Substantive Area” below) must be considered in all its complexity, because, for example, one could not do justice to the complexity of actual state preferences by examining “military deployment”. Instead one would have to distinguish between peacemaking and peacekeeping measures, measures taken with and without UN mandates, the adoption of common strategies, and so on. A framework of analysis might look as follows:

**Figure 1: Example of a Framework of Analysis**

1. Classical War
1.1. Self Defense
1.1.1. ...
1.2. Peacekeeping Measures
1.2.1. Common Positions
1.2.2. Intervention with UN Mandate
1.2.3. Intervention without UN Mandate
1.3. ...
2. Civil War
2.1. ...
2.1.1. ...
2.1.2. ...
3. ...
4. ...

The hierarchy of the entries merely serves to structure the content of the material; the main subdivisions, that correspond to the topic areas to be investigated (see below), are thus very specific. Only the most basic subdivisions within each grouping will be empirically examined.

*Selection of Institutions:* Large areas like security and rule are not the domain of a single international institution. “International institution” is here a collective term for international organizations, international regimes and informal conventions (Keohane 1989). Often a number of international institutions work on specific issues that are very similar in content. This is overlooked by studies that focus on single institutions. Moreover, within a single international institution (such as the EU), there are often significant differences with respect to the intensity of cooperation on different issues.

Therefore, taking states as the point of departure and without anticipating any particular outcome, this study will examine what questions are dealt with by which institu-

tions and for what reasons. As a result, this study will also pay attention to institutions that typically escape general attention (like the Council of Europe).

The institutions examined in this study can be distinguished according to the intensity of cooperation within them. A simple ordinal scale to measure the degree of internationalization might distinguish between the simple obligation to engage in consultations (1), the common implementation of measures (*pooling* of sovereignty) with unanimous decision-making (2) or with majority decision-making (3) and the delegation of authority to implement measures to independent institutions (4).

Through the combination of the two dimensions – “topics” and “selection of institutions” – one would gain a comprehensive and empirically rich description of state preferences regarding the internationalization of the monopoly of force. For each individual topic in the table above, one would ascertain the degree of institutionalization, the preferred institution(s) for working on the topic, and additional qualitative information that would otherwise be lost through the scaling. Scales that are relevant to aspects of this study already exist in the literature (Lindberg 1971; Schmitter 1996; Schmidt 1999) and these can be further refined. The director of this project has experience using this method to construct scales (Jachtenfuchs 2002). The scale will be developed in the first phase of the project and its usefulness tested in a pretest.

The factors that will be drawn on in the explanation (*independent variables*) can be combined into three groups:

1. *Transnationalization of the Problem Situations*: The hypothesis tested here is that states are only prepared to internationalize the monopoly of force when major changes in the situation fundamentally impact the (objective) interests of the states. These include, for example, a massive increase in nearby military conflicts, an increase in terrorist attacks, etc. (for relevant datasets cf. Beisheim et al. 1999). These approaches to explanation which are characteristic of realism, interdependence theory and theories of political economy.
2. *Systems of Ideas*: The thesis to be tested here is that different ideas about appropriate action and about the interpretation of specific situations lead, all else being equal, to different state preferences. An example would be the multilateral orientation attributed to Germany; that is, its understanding of its role as a civilian power as opposed to the French orientation toward national sovereignty (Wagner and Hellmann 2002.;

Kirste and Maull 1996). These are constructivist approaches to explaining state preferences.

3. *Domestic Political Structures*: These include the structure and strength of the relevant systems for transforming and aggregating individual interests, administrative structures, government structure (federal/centralist) etc. For example, one could argue that the fragmented and politically “weak” Italian state leans more strongly towards internationalization than the “strong” French state. In the language of international relations these are *domestic structure*-approaches.

In the second phase of the project, these clusters of factors will be further concretized and operationalized for the empirical investigation on the basis of a review of relevant theories.

The assumption here is that external influences are the *impulse* behind preference change in the direction of internationalization – why would states subject one of their most precious resources, the monopoly of force, to restrictions without good cause? The exact form of these preferences can, however, only be very roughly predicted on the basis of such ultimately structuralist theories. On the basis of prior research by the project director, it is expected that systems of ideas are responsible for the *concretization* of these structurally determined paths of action and thus for the great variety in the resulting state preferences. Domestic political structures may be responsible for further *restricting* the conceivable preferences.

The third phase of the project is concerned with the impact of preferences. Attention is focused on the one hand on developed and developing international institutions. How can their form be explained with reference to the preferences of the states examined (see below), what conflicts emerge and how can the network of multilevel systems that has developed in the domain of the monopoly of force be conceptualized? Here the goal is to build on this project’s contribution to theories of international institutions. On the other hand, attention is directed inwards in this third phase of the project: if not even the monopoly of force is exclusively within the control of states, what impact will this have on the legitimation of and control over state policy in this area? The goal is to contribute to the theory of constitutionalism in the postnational situation. This segment of the project will involve collaboration with legal scholars.

### ***1.1.2 Research Method***

To describe, explain and assess the consequences of possible transformations in state preferences with regard to the internationalization of the monopoly of force, it will first be necessary to compile a wide-ranging dataset. This is because in this field, in contrast to others, no such database is currently available. It will be necessary to balance the need for breadth (as many countries as possible, quantitative study) with the need for depth (as many and varied areas as possible, case studies).

#### **Selection of Areas**

The selection of the areas to be investigated is oriented towards gaining a large variation in the dependent variable so as not to prejudice the outcome “Transformation of the State” through the study design. At the same time, the areas analyzed must cover the essential elements of the monopoly of force. After all, the area in which the classical division of tasks between military and police are increasingly complementing each other and which is considered in the literature to be gaining in importance should also be included: the combination of civil war, state terrorism, terrorism and drug trafficking (Kaldor 2000; Laqueur 1996, 2001). All areas must also be conducive to comparisons between the 1970s and the 1990s. Therefore the following four areas were selected:

- *Classical war*: The object of study here is on the one hand national defense, and on the other the different forms of military intervention in wars between states;
- *Civil War*: This concerns violent internal social conflicts in which the states in the study (see below) consider the use of force to end the conflict;
- *Transnational Terrorism*: This deals with a challenge that has long been a central concern for states and that has seemed to necessitate intensive cooperation;
- *Cross-Border Criminality*: This refers to those forms of crimes that are not perceived as a threat to the state but call for common action because of their cross-border character. Even in this area one can expect differences between EU member states.

The boundaries between these four areas are fluid. The areas are also not conceived as sharply delimited causal factors or categories of configurations of characteristics but as a heuristic for structuring the variety of state preferences. The actual analysis will be carried out on the level of concrete cases.

## **Selection of Countries**

Because the first phase of the study is exploratory in nature and does not involve hypothesis testing, it will consider a broad spectrum of state preferences. To this end it is useful to look at a widely varying “state profiles”. The study will first be limited to larger states because, according to a „folk theorem“ of Europe scholarship, they have alternatives to internationalization. The characteristics “EU membership”, “NATO membership” and “medium power” are thus held constant. In the second phase of the project, the USA, a special case because of its size and power, and one or two smaller states will be introduced as controls. The countries to be included in the study are:

- *Germany*: “Schengen” member, long border that is difficult to control – in part with former Warsaw Pact nations –, strong currents of internationalism in systems of ideas, federal state, decentralized police system;
- *France*: “Schengen” member, critical of NATO, strong emphasis on state sovereignty, centralized state, centralized police system;
- *Great Britain*: not member of “Schengen”, island nation, strong emphasis on state sovereignty, centralized state, decentralized police system;
- *Italy*: “Schengen” member, long border that is difficult to monitor, strong currents of internationalism in systems of ideas, weak state, centralized but fragmented police system.

## **Period of Study**

This study covers the period from 1970 to about 2010 with a focus on two shorter time spans therein:

- *The 1970s*: The DCIS is fully developed. This period sees a strong transnationalization of problem situations that also affect the monopoly of force. New institutions are created or existing institutions transformed to deal with these problems.
- *The late 1990s*: The transnationalization of problem situations has increased substantially, not least because of the EU internal market and the end of the East-West conflict. “Global governance” is discussed as an option in political circles.

This division into time periods allows for an inter-temporal comparison on the one hand and the possibility of an in-depth examination of individual cases on the other.

## **Methodology**

The project is made up of four parallel case studies. For each country preferences regarding the four topics above will be ascertained. There will be intensive collaboration between the individual country studies, especially as concerns the determination of concrete cases to be examined. A “case” refers here not to a country, but to the preferences of a given country with respect to a specific topic in a specific time period. An example would be the preferences of Germany with respect to the EU rapid reaction force in the late 1990s. As far as possible the same or at least comparable problem areas will be analyzed for all the countries.

The preferences themselves will be ascertained through a critical examination of official and, as far as possible, internal documents. Only if preferences cannot be discovered through this method will interviews be used. Preferences can be distinguished from strategies, tactics, rhetorical justifications etc. in that they have to do with relatively abstract desired results of interactions with a certain degree of stability over time (cf. Moravcsik 1997; Zürn 1997). This methodological approach has been used successfully in the past (for greater detail see Jachtenfuchs 2002: 220-224). In addition to the documents produced by the states themselves and media reports, the specialized news agency “Agence Europe” will be an invaluable resource, especially with respect to the European Union. Especially in the areas of “transnational terrorism” and “cross-border crime”, archival work and interviews in the responsible ministries and international institutions will be necessary.

The methodological approach will allow for a tabular representation of the cases (the specific topic, for example “peace-keeping measures under a UN mandate in civil wars” within an organization like the EU) with specific characteristics (“common measures through unanimity, value “2” on the scale measuring internationalization introduced as an example above). The table might look as follows, where the numerical values refer to the internationalization scale developed as an example above. All values are fictitious and serve only as an illustration.



**Figure 2: Example of a Tabular Presentation of the Data**

		Country 1 1970s	Country 1 1970s (Comments)	Country 2 1970s	...
Topic 1	EU	4	Conflict within the Governing Coalition	3	
	NATO	4		-	
	UN	2		2	
	...				
Topic 2	EU	...		...	
	...	...			
Topic 3					
...					

This will not be a classical study with a large number of cases, nor will it be simply a combination of qualitative case studies. Instead, this study attempts to overcome the opposition between quantitative and qualitative methods in the social sciences that discussions over methodology have increasingly characterized as fruitless. A number of methodological tools have been developed to attempt to overcome the dichotomy between the two approaches, for example Charles Ragin’s “qualitative comparative analysis” (Ragin 1987, 1994; Berg-Schlosser and Quenter 1996; cf. Ragin et. al. 1996).

Methods that are suitable for mid-size data sets, that is, for those whose structures cannot be grasped at first glance nor analyzed with classical statistical tools, include “formal concept analysis”, a method developed in applied mathematics (Ganter and Wille 1996). “Formal concept analysis” is particularly useful for extracting information from complex and relatively unstructured data sets. The analytical benefit comes from the graphic depiction of the data, which reveals relationships of content that would otherwise have gone unnoticed. The method has, in recent years, been used in very different fields, including political science (Kohler-Koch 1989; Kohler-Koch and Vogt 1994; also in the Darmstadt Project on the Exploration and Visualization of the “Regime Database”).

Both “qualitative comparative analysis” and formal concept analysis represent a good compromise between facility of use and high analytical yield. They will therefore be used in the second phase of the project, which is dedicated to the explanation of preferences. In preparation for this, in the first phase the preferences ascertained will not simply be described but will be recorded in a database according to formal criteria.

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