



# TranState Working Papers

NEGOTIATING REFORMS  
IN THE PUBLIC SERVICES:  
TRAJECTORIES OF NEW PUBLIC  
MANAGEMENT POLICIES IN THE  
SWEDISH AND FRENCH POLICE  
FORCES

JENNIE AUFFENBERG  
BERNHARD KITTEL

No. 188

Universität Bremen • University of Bremen  
Jacobs Universität Bremen • Jacobs University Bremen  
Universität Oldenburg • University of Oldenburg

---

Staatlichkeit im Wandel • Transformations of the State  
Sonderforschungsbereich 597 • Collaborative Research Center 597



*Jennie Auffenberg*  
*Bernhard Kittel*

***Negotiating Reforms in the Public Services:  
Trajectories of New Public Management Policies  
in the Swedish and French Police Forces***

TranState Working Papers

No. 188

*Sfb597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ – „Transformations of the State“*

Bremen, 2015

[ISSN 1861-1176]

**Jennie Auffenberg, Bernhard Kittel**

Negotiating Reforms in the Public Services: Trajectories of New Public Management Policies in the Swedish and French Police Forces

(TranState Working Papers, 188)

Bremen: Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“, 2015

ISSN 1861-1176

Universität Bremen

Sonderforschungsbereich 597 / Collaborative Research Center 597

Staatlichkeit im Wandel / Transformations of the State

Postfach 33 04 40

D - 28334 Bremen

Tel.:+ 49 421 218-56644

Fax:+ 49 421 218-56633

Homepage: <http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de>

---

Diese Arbeit ist im Sonderforschungsbereich 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“, Bremen, entstanden und wurde auf dessen Veranlassung unter Verwendung der ihm von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft zur Verfügung gestellten Mittel veröffentlicht.

Deutsche  
Forschungsgemeinschaft

**DFG**

## **ABSTRACT**

The paper addresses the effect of governmental policy styles and trade union strategies in the implementation of organizational reforms inspired by New Public Management in the Swedish and French police forces over the years 1999-2013. By tracing the discourse in editorials of internal news magazines published by the ministry of the interior and by the trade unions representing the police forces, we reconstruct the negotiation process and the positions taken by the bargaining partners in the reform initiatives. Highlighting parallels and differences between the reforms in Sweden and France we contrast the consensual policy style of a top administration detached from political influences facing a unified trade union in Sweden with the confrontational policy style of a highly intertwined administrative and political elite facing a fragmented trade union movement in France. As a result, reforms in Sweden were piecemeal but continuous and unidirectional while they were more radical but moving back and forth in France.

## **CONTENTS**

|       |   |    |
|-------|---|----|
| 1     | INTRODUCTION .....  | 1  |
| 2     | THE CHALLENGE: COST PRESSURE AND NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IDEOLOGY ..... | 2  |
| 3     | THE CONDITIONS: POLICY STYLES AND TRADE UNION STRUCTURES.....         | 2  |
| 3.1   | Policy Styles.....  | 3  |
| 3.2   | Employee Relations and Trade Unions .....                             | 4  |
| 3.2.1 | Actors in Swedish and French employment relations.....                | 5  |
| 3.2.2 | Reforms of Swedish and French employment relations.....               | 8  |
| 3.3   | Hypotheses .....  | 8  |
| 4     | DATA AND METHOD .....   | 9  |
| 5     | PARALLELS: THREE WAVES OF REFORM .....                                | 10 |
| 6     | DIFFERENCES IN DETAILS .....  | 11 |
| 6.1   | First wave: Decentralization.....                                     | 11 |
| 6.1.1 | Sweden.....   | 12 |
| 6.1.2 | France.....   | 13 |
| 6.2   | Second Wave: Performance measurement and budget reform.....           | 15 |
| 6.2.1 | Sweden.....   | 15 |
| 6.2.2 | France.....   | 19 |
| 6.3   | Third wave: Intensification of performance management.....            | 23 |
| 6.3.1 | Sweden.....   | 23 |
| 6.3.2 | France.....   | 26 |
| 7     | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .....                                       | 30 |
|       | BIBLIOGRAPHY .....  | 36 |
|       | APPENDIX.....   | 41 |
|       | BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE .....   | 42 |

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

Since the 1970s, new public management (NPM) was the main paradigm in the transformation of public services in advanced capitalist countries. These reforms were accompanied by numerous studies examining the extent and implementation of these reforms in a comparative perspective (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). However, the role of employees' representations in the reform process and the effect of the latter on public sector employment remained largely neglected (for exemplary studies primarily of Anglo-American countries see Bach and Kolins Givan 2011; Camfield 2007; Duncan 2010; Howell 1998; Ibsen et al. 2011). This particularly holds true for one of the core fields of the public service, the police (Maillard and Savage 2012). This article attempts to contribute to filling this gap by undertaking a comparative analysis of the responses of trade unions and personnel representatives to NPM-inspired police reforms and their impact on public employment regimes in France and Sweden.

Cost transparency and containment through efficiency-enhancement have been major driving forces for the introduction of public management reforms in OECD countries since the 1980s (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Although the concept of New Public Management is heterogeneous and contradictory, there is agreement on the main ideas of NPM. These ideas can be summarized as the combination of privatization, marketization and managerialism, aiming at reducing the differences between public and private sector and shifting process-orientation to result-orientation (Bordogna and Neri 2011: 2316). In particular, performance assessment and performance-related pay have been major issues on the reform agenda. In this study, we take these two observations as a point of departure for analyzing potentially conflicting interests by exploring the fate of management reforms in the public sector. Studying reform processes in France and Sweden we focus on two intertwined questions: Which reform initiatives are actually undertaken, and how do representatives of public employees respond to these reforms? The main aim of this paper is to assess the chronology of events, of actions and reactions and thus the identification of disagreements and their solutions.

As we will outline below, Sweden and France are characterized by very different profiles with respect to the two variables which we contend to be crucial conditions of implemented reform trajectories. We will first introduce our analytical approach and give a short overview about data and methods of this paper. Then we will present our empirical findings grouped according to the three waves of New Public Management reform, identified in the literature and through analysis of our data. Finally we will discuss these findings on the basis of the analytical approach.

## **2 THE CHALLENGE: COST PRESSURE AND NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IDEOLOGY**

Public services are considered paradigmatic examples of Baumol's cost disease argument which states that the lacking or low rate of productivity growth in many services necessarily drives up the costs of delivering those services in the context of growing economies (Baumol 1967; Baumol and Bowen 1965). In a nutshell, "the faster the general pace of technological advance, the greater will be the increase in the overall wage level and the greater the upward pressure on costs in those industries which do not enjoy increased productivity" (Baumol and Bowen 1965: : 500). Because the labor market is economy-wide, all sectors have to keep up with general wage increases to some extent in order to avoid losing labor supply. For the public sector more specifically, findings are partly supportive of the cost disease argument, although not overwhelming. In a panel study of 17 OECD countries for the period 1995-2005, Tepe concludes: "Although public employees' compensation expenditure appears to demand a growing fraction of government budgets, which provides tentative support of Baumol's cost disease, the majority of countries managed to contain or even reduce absolute public personnel expenditure" (Tepe 2009), whereby employment in public administration in the narrower sense remained largely stable.

One of the "stagnant services" in the public sector explicitly mentioned by Baumol (1996) is police protection, without, however, providing evidence in this regard. In a study of cost developments in the Dutch police forces, van Reenen (1999) finds supportive evidence for the cost disease argument, although he asserts that apart from the restrictions in saving personnel costs, normative concerns are an important hindrance to cost containment. Because police protection is one of the core services, but also a prerogative, of the sovereign state, states are unwilling to privatize more than marginal tasks.

This structural pressure has certainly invigorated ideas of "entrepreneurial government" (Osborne and Gaebler 1991) fostering, for example, the concept of the citizen as customer of government services, the institutionalization of market mechanisms in the provision of public services, and the initiation of efficiency and outcome performance as a yardstick of evaluation (Hood 1991; Page 2005). Such reforms became the reference model of "modern" and "sustainable" governance (OECD 2008) and were claimed to be an irreversible, universal development (Kettl 2005).

## **3 THE CONDITIONS: POLICY STYLES AND TRADE UNION STRUCTURES**

Viewed from an industrial relations perspective, the success of a reform depends on the way in which the proponents of reform introduce the initiative and on the way in which

potential veto players respond to the initiative. Clearly, the two are intertwined because the proponents of reform will anticipate potential responses and stakeholders will actually react to the chosen strategy. The following table summarizes our expected factors of influence that will be discussed in detail in the following subsections.

*Table 1: Factors determining influence on reform implementation and modification*

|               | <b>Employer</b>      |                            | <b>Trade unions</b>  |                    |                                | <i>Demands</i>  | <b>Interaction Mode</b>                     |
|---------------|----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------|---|
|               | <i>Concentration</i> | <i>Strategy</i>            | <i>Concentration</i> | <i>Competition</i> | <i>Strategy</i>                |                 |   |
| <b>Sweden</b> | Medium               | Consensual, defensive      | High                 | None               | Logic of membership, offensive | Universal       | Negotiated trade-off                        |
| <b>France</b> | High                 | Confrontational, offensive | Low                  | High               | Logic of influence, defensive  | Particularistic | Pre-emptive and partly negotiated trade-off |

*Own presentation, based on Bach and Kessler (2007); Culpepper (2002); (2003); Natali and Rhodes (2004); Schmitter and Streeck (1999); Silver (2003); Wright (2000)*

### **3.1 Policy Styles**

Following Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), we thus study the effect of two factors that have been identified as major conditions of successful implementation of reform. Firstly, we argue that the mode of interaction between the government, the administrative elite, and the public employees, that is, the politico-administrative regime, crucially determines the extent to which resistance from public employees is activated. Secondly, we argue that the strength of trade union resistance affects the extent to which reform plans are actually implemented.

We first turn to the politico-administrative regime. It is described by the characteristics of (1) the state structure, (2) the executive government, (3) the relationship between political executives and top civil servants, (4) the administrative culture and (5) the diversity of influence on reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Here we focus on the third and fifth characteristic because these are directly relevant for the preferences of reform agents on the one hand, and for the available choice set of possible reform strategies on the other hand. The third characteristic affects the “ownership” of reforms. Whether top civil servants consider themselves as bargaining partners or merely agents for the politicians is one factor determining the scope and intensity of reforms. The more top civil servants are involved in the preparation of a reform, the more likely will they develop own stakes in its implementation. The fifth characteristic, diversity of influence, differentiates between closed systems of negotiating reforms and systems which involve a broad spectrum of societal groups. As Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) show, these charac-

teristics tend to vary in a comparative perspective, thereby generating different country profiles.

Natali and Rhodes (2004) have proposed a distinction between ‘consensual’ and ‘confrontational’ policy styles. While they focus on the governmental drafting process of the reforms, there is no reason not to extend the applicability of the concept to negotiations between employers and employees about the implementation of NPM reforms. The top administration of the police forces thereby takes the role of the policy-maker and the trade unions as involved parties. In the consensual policy style, policy-makers seek to build support for reform from all involved parties, while in the confrontational style they impose their agenda without concessions to involved parties.

France and Sweden represent two contrasting country profiles. With regard to the relations of political executives and top civil servants, career paths of the French *grands corps* are extensively intertwined, thus it is more likely that these elites share perspectives. The problem of ownership of reforms rather appears on a lower level of the hierarchy. In comparison to the French case, Swedish political executives and mandarins are more separated and thus ownership problems are likely to occur already further up in hierarchy (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 48 ff., 59 f.). With regard to sources of policy advice, reforms were traditionally drafted within the *grands corps* in France whereas in Sweden an external debate led by academic experts, business associations and trade unions accompanied the reform process (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 50, 66 f.). Due to these profound differences of the two cases we expect to find contrasting modes of interaction which will be discussed in the next section.

### **3.2 Employee Relations and Trade Unions**

In order to account for heterogeneity of the public sector workforce and with respect to the special role of the employees of the higher echelons in the reform process, Wright (2000) and Silver (2003) have suggested to take the structural bargaining power of employees at the workplace into account. The workplace bargaining power is the power emanating from the position of employees in the process of production of a good or service. Depending on their relative strength in the workplace, reforms will be designed in a more advantageous way for top civil servants and higher echelons or not. In this respect, the concept of dualization (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Palier and Thelen 2010) suggests that the crucial position of top civil servants in the implementation of reforms implies that this group of employees is advantaged, which in turn will increase vertical disintegration among civil servants and a “dualization” of working conditions. This will contribute to a further decrease of public sector privileges in total because it lowers the number of employees with privileged working conditions.

Given that public management reforms typically tend to increase work pressure and worsen working conditions for a large part of the public workforce, employees should be rather unwilling to accept them and they may thus invoke resistance from public employees. Since trade unions have better access to the information governments need to enable their reform initiatives to succeed (Culpepper 2002), governments may under certain conditions choose a consensual strategy.

Whether reform initiatives indeed lead to widespread discontent and resistance among public employees and whether this resistance will be given collective voice in lobbying activities and industrial action depends on the structure of both the public sector trade unions and the differentiation of the state as an employer. Trade unions have to consider their members' concerns on the one hand, and their positioning in the strategic interaction with their counterparts on the other (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). Hence the extent to which trade unions articulate discontent and organize industrial action against reforms in the public employment regime depends on the internal structure of worker representation in a policy area.

The primary power of interest associations derives from their structure, which is composed of three factors. First, the degree of concentration, respectively fragmentation, of members' interests, second, the unions' ability to recruit members, and third, the ability of the umbrella organization to commit their member associations to their objectives (Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel 2001). Associations will develop their strategic orientation under the condition of their specific profile with respect to these organizational structures. They determine their resources as well as their strategy in terms of representing particular or universal interests in a more offensive or defensive way.

As discussed above, the primary actors in public sector industrial relations in Sweden and France differ profoundly in structure. On the side of the trade union they differ with respect to their concentration and centralization, on the employers' side they do not only differ in their degree of concentration but also in their relation to the government.

### ***3.2.1 Actors in Swedish and French employment relations***

Collective bargaining in the *Swedish* police sector is framed by the central collective agreement (*Ramavtal Löner inom Staten*, RALS) which is renewed at varying intervals between one and four years. It is concluded at the central level by the Swedish Agency for Government Employers (*Arbetsgivarverket*), the umbrella organization of the Swedish agencies, and the umbrella organizations of the trade unions, OFR S/P/O, Saco-S and SEKO. It sets out the framework and conditions for local pay negotiations and also covers job security, pension systems, working hours, holidays and other general employment conditions. The agreement nevertheless leaves a wide scope to the parties at the agency level to adapt the terms to their own conditions in local collective agree-

ments (Arbetsgivarverket 2004; 2009a: 14). In the police sector, the Rikspolisstyrelsen and the Polisförbundet conclude the sectoral agreement which is to be specified by the local police departments (Polisförbundet 2013b). The *Rikspolisstyrelsen* is a government agency and the central administrative and supervisory authority for the Swedish police. The Swedish government appoints its Commissioner, who is responsible for the operations at the authority (Swedish National Police Board 2012). As a government agency, the Rikspolisstyrelsen cannot only be regarded as employer but also needs to be perceived as an agent of its own. Its interest is not always and necessarily aligned with the principal's, that is, the government's interest. Its special position gives the Rikspolisstyrelsen a second option which is to ally with employees against the central government (Lane 2005: 38 ff.). In this way, employees would have additional support for their cause. Due to the different levels of collective bargaining the Swedish public employer is rather fragmented.

The Swedish police union *Polisförbundet*, organizes more than 96 % of all police officers in Sweden (Polisförbundet 2013a). The Swedish police forces are divided into three personnel categories which are police chiefs, police officers and civilian personnel (Stenmark 2005: 32). As the *Polisförbundet* represents all police officers, the heterogeneity of their membership is fairly high and therefore unifying interests is more difficult. This should lead to a more universal orientation in their interest representation. At the same time, trade union density is high and there are no competing trade unions. Therefore we expect the Swedish police trade union to pursue an offensive strategy while being able to make compromises and conclude pacts. Although the *Rikspolisstyrelsen* is fragmented, it is still organized hierarchically and able to oblige police departments to revise their local collective agreements. In consequence, it can be expected to pursue a universal but rather defensive strategy.

In the *French* police forces, the Ministry of the Interior on the employer side and a whole range of police trade unions on the employee side are the collective actors involved in collective bargaining. The French national police is under the control of the French Ministry of the Interior, which is also the interlocutor in collective bargaining. Trade unions in France are highly segmented, according to their political orientation as well as to the status of their membership (Loubet del Bayle 2010: 166 ff.). The French police workforce can be grouped into four hierarchical levels. (1) The *contractuels* are employed on contract basis and consist of particularly young staff. (2) The *corps d'encadrement et d'application* are civil servants and constitute the largest group in the police workforce, represented by the *gardiens de la paix* and *brigadiers*. (3) The *corps de commandement* mainly consists of the *officiers*, and (4) the *corps de conception et de direction* is the highest level and mainly composed of *commissaires*. Each of the status groups has its own trade union organizations. French police trade unions have a long

and complex history of mergers, separations, and emergence of new trade unions. During the period examined here, there were five main trade unions according to the results of the *élections professionnelles* (Loubet del Bayle 2010: 165). The UNSA-Police and Alliance Police Nationale represent the *gardiens de la paix*. SNOP-UNSA and Synergie Officiers both represent the *officiers*. The smallest group of the police workforce, the *commissaires*, is represented by a single trade union, the SCPN. UNSA-Police and SNOP-UNSA traditionally support left-wing policies, whereas Alliance Police Nationale and Synergie Officiers are in favor of right-wing policies (Loubet del Bayle 2010: 166). In total, and in stark contrast to other sectors, 70 percent of the police workforce are trade union members (Loubet del Bayle 2010: 160).

*Table 2: Overview of trade union landscapes in Sweden and France*

| Sweden             |                | France                             |  |   |
|--------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|--|---|
| Status group       | Trade union    | Status group                       | <u>Main trade unions</u>   |   |
|                    |                |                                    | Leftist  | Rightist  |
|                    |                | Contractuels                       | (No special trade union, status group not represented in professional elections) |   |
| Civilian personnel | Polisförbundet | Gardiens de la paix and brigadiers | Unité Police (formerly UNSA Police)  | Alliance Police Nationale   |
| Police officers    |                | Officiers                          | Syndicat des Cadres de la Sécurité Intérieure (SCSI) (formerly SNOP-UNSA)        | Synergie officiers  |
| Police chiefs      |                | Commissaires                       | Syndicat indépendant des commissaires de police (SICP)                           | Syndicat des commissaires et hauts fonctionnaires de la police nationale (SCPN) |

Own presentation, for France based on results of the professional elections 2000-2010

As a unified actor, the Ministry of the Interior is expected to pursue an offensive strategy which focuses on universalistic aims embedded in the government's overall political strategy. Due to a low degree of concentration of the French police sector trade unions, that is the representation of small sub-groups in different trade unions, we expect that they will form rather particularistic positions. Given that also trade union density is high, one would assume that police sector unions will act in a confrontational way and as such be recognized as political actor and negotiation partner. However, trade unions are not only fragmented but also competing for members, which will, according to the logic of membership (Schmitter and Streeck 1999: 19-24), contribute to an even more confrontational approach. This logic is counterbalanced by the logic of influence, which pushes competing trade unions into a more concessionary strategy if their bargaining partner has enough power to play them off against each other. Given the special status of the state as employer (Traxler 1999), including, in particular, rule by law, and the close affiliation between trade unions and political parties which restrains confronta-

tional action from trade unions affiliated to the governing party, the logic of influence may dominate the logic of membership as soon as two or more trade unions compete.

### **3.2.2 Reforms of Swedish and French employment relations**

Employment relations in France as such have only been subject to moderate changes during the period under consideration (Berrebi-Hoffmann et al. 2009: 197). Sweden, in turn, faced a major change in public sector collective bargaining. In 1994, the Swedish government replaced the National Bargaining Office with the independent Swedish Agency for Government Employers (*Arbetsgivarverket*). Since then, the *Arbetsgivarverket's* main function has been to negotiate central agreements with the trade unions (Arbetsgivarverket 2009b). In the past, the budget system fully compensated agencies for increased labor costs as set by central agreements between the National Collective Bargaining Office and the trade unions. With the introduction of frame appropriations with cash limits, agencies were incentivized to keep the costs in central agreements low (Andersson and Schager 1999: 253 ff.; OECD 2005: 153; Swedish Ministry of Finance 1995: 18; Yates 2000: 162).

Apart from the aforementioned changes in the bargaining order in Sweden, it was first and foremost public sector restructuring in Sweden and France that caused incremental change and led to profound changes in status, employment conditions and relations in the public sector (Berrebi-Hoffmann et al. 2009: 197; Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 2 f.). As a consequence, privileges of the public sector workforce are gradually diminishing (Gold and Veersma 2011: 39 f.).

### **3.3 Hypotheses**

Following the distinction between consensual and confrontational policy styles, we thus contend that the more reforms are implemented in a bureaucratic top-down procedure, the more will they face resistance from employees. In contrast, the more reforms are part of a negotiated process, the less likely they will give reason for organized resistance. At the same time, reforms in the consensual style should be more piecemeal and less thorough. The following intertwined hypotheses summarize our expectations that will guide our analysis.

Hypothesis 1: The more consensual the dominating policy style, the less resistance it will face from trade unions and the more confrontational the dominating policy style, the more resistance it will face from trade unions.

Hypothesis 2: In a fragmented trade union movement, the stronger the workplace bargaining power of trade unions' membership the more will that its membership benefit from reforms.

Hypothesis 3: The more fragmented a trade union movement, the more particularistic and defensive will be its response to reform initiatives.

Jointly, the hypotheses on the policy style and on the trade union structure and strategy suggest that, *ceteris paribus*, the French reform strategy will be more encompassing but also more confrontational than the Swedish, and that, the French trade union response will be more defensive than the Swedish response, and less influential due to high fragmentation of the trade union movement.

#### **4 DATA AND METHOD**

To address these hypotheses, we have analyzed the content of editorial articles in magazines regularly published by the employers and trade unions in the French and Swedish police. These include monthly published editorials of the Swedish Police Agency (*Svensk Polis*)<sup>1</sup> and the French Ministry of the Interior (*Civique*)<sup>2</sup> as well as of the main Swedish and French police trade unions, Polisförbundet (*Polistidningen*),<sup>3</sup> UNSA-Police and its successors (*UNSA Police Magazine*, *Unité Police Magazine*),<sup>4</sup> Alliance Police Nationale (*Police Nationale*).<sup>5</sup> As the *corps d'encadrement et d'application* represents around 88 % of the civil servants, we primarily focused on this group and their trade unions in the French case (Loubet del Bayle 2010: 160 f.).

Based on a preliminary assessment of the topics covered, editorials from 1990 to 2013 for Sweden and 1999 to 2013 for France were selected and systematically analyzed by qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2008). The selected time periods have been identified as the most decisive for new public management reforms in the police sectors in these countries to date. An editorial was included into the database if it covered a topic relevant for New Public Management. Our category system for the selection was based on the definition of New Public Management proposed by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), which encompasses four main trajectories. (1) Reforms in financial management are characterized by budget reforms towards output- and performance-orientation and strategic budget cuts. (2) Reforms in personnel management are marked by stagnation or reduction of salaries, personnel cuts, reduced pension rights and aboli-

---

<sup>1</sup> Rikspolisstyrelsen (1962-) *Svensk polis - tidskrift för Sveriges polisväsende*, Stockholm: Inrikesdepartementet.

<sup>2</sup> Ministère de l'intérieur (1997-) *Civique - le magazine du Ministère de l'intérieur*, Paris: Ministère de l'intérieur, Service de l'information et des relations publiques.

<sup>3</sup> Polisförbundet (1941-) *Polistidningen - organ för Svenska polisförbundet*, Stockholm: Svenska Polisförbundet.

<sup>4</sup> Union nationale des syndicats autonomes de la police (UNSA) (2003-2008) *UNSA-police magazine*, Pantin: UNSA-police; Unité Police (2009-) *Unité police magazine*, Bagnolet: Unité police.

<sup>5</sup> Alliance police nationale (2004-) *Alliance police nationale*, Paris: Alliance police nationale.

tion of other protections and privileges, as well as measures directed at attaining more flexible, responsive, result-oriented and skilled civil servants. These reforms usually were only performed after innovations in organizational structures and management. (3) Organizational reforms are directed at specialization of institutions, coordination across functions, levels and sectors, centralization and decentralization and scale of organizations. (4) Measurement of performance comes along with new personnel management and organizational restructuring (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 75 ff.).

Out of a total of 654 editorials published in the time period covered, 396 (61 percent) dealt with New Public Management reforms and related topics and were thus selected for qualitative content analysis.<sup>6</sup> These editorials were summarized in order to reduce the material while conserving the content of the original material. For this matter, meaningless or identical passages were paraphrased and similar passages were bundled. The summarized text passages were subsequently coded (see Appendix Table 6 for the category system). Codes were mainly derived from the key categories of the analysis, which are interaction between employers and employees, introduction of management elements and performance measures, decentralization and centralization, and changes in working conditions and pay. In order to control the coding process, codes and subcodes were defined, examples from the text material were assigned and coding rules for conflicting codes were formulated (Mayring 2008).

The sheer number of editorials dealing with specific aspects of reforms is suggestive of the importance of this topic from the perspective of the involved parties. As the main aim of our analysis is the assessment of events, actions and reactions, as well as disagreements and their solution, we will focus on a description of the process. Furthermore, reforms built upon one another and cooperation developed over time, we will nevertheless present our findings in a chronological order.

## **5 PARALLELS: THREE WAVES OF REFORM**

Public sector reforms in Sweden and in France reveal multiple parallels and can both be grouped into three waves (see Table 2).

The first wave of the Swedish reform process started in the late 1970s and encompassed decentralization, devolution of services and deregulation. The second wave took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s and entailed cutbacks, a budget reform and the

---

<sup>6</sup> For Sweden, out of a total of 366 editorials (198 of *Polistidningen*, 168 *Svensk Polis*), 262 editorials were selected (134 of *Polistidningen*, 128 of *Svensk Polis*). For France, out of a total of 288 editorials (168 of *Civique*, 62 of *Police Nationale*, 58 of *UNSA-Police Magazine*), 134 editorials were selected (58 of *Civique*, 46 of *Police Nationale*, 30 of *UNSA-Police Magazine*).

introduction of performance management. The third wave started in 2006 with the newly elected right-wing government, focusing on privatization and service quality (Ibsen et al. 2011: 2304, 8; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 307 f.; Stenmark 2005; Westerberg 2004).

In France, the first wave took place from the early 1980s to the early 1990s and concerned decentralization and devolution followed by privatization. The second wave covered the 1990s and led to a budget reform and the introduction of performance management in 2001. The third wave began in the early 2000s and contained a “qualitative shift” after the 2007 election of President Sarkozy with strong cutbacks and intensified performance management (Bordogna and Neri 2011: 2323; Maillard and Savage 2012; Mucchielli 2008).

*Table 3: Reform waves in Sweden and France at the state level*

| <i>Wave</i>        | <b>Sweden</b>  |   | <b>France</b> |   |
|--------------------|--|---|---------------|---|
|                    | <i>Time</i>  | <i>Reforms</i>  | <i>Time</i>   | <i>Reforms</i>  |
| <i>First wave</i>  | Late 1970s-1980s   | Decentralization and de-bureaucratization   | 1980s-1990s   | Decentralization, devolution, contractualization  |
| <i>Second wave</i> | Late 1980s-early 1990s (reform inactivity until early 2000s) | Reduction of public expenditures, privatization, deregulation of working conditions, result-orientation | 1990s-2006    | Reduction of public expenditures, budget reform and results-orientation (LOLF), performance-related pay |
| <i>Third wave</i>  | 2006-2011  | Privatization and citizen focus   | 2007-2011     | Personnel reduction and performance rewarding (RGPP)  |

Own presentation, based on Bézès (2007); Bordogna and Neri (2011); Cole (2010); Hemerijck, Huiskamp and de Boer (2002); Ibsen et al. (2011); Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011); Premfors (1998); Rouban (2008)

Also with regard to reforms in the French and Swedish police parallels can be found. Both countries experienced decentralization of the police and a strong focus on citizens during the first wave, followed by a turn to management by objectives and performance management in the second wave, and subsequent budgetary cuts, organizational centralization, and a return to more citizen-focused policies and a partial renunciation of performance management in recent times (Ibsen et al. 2011: 2304 ff.; Maillard and Savage 2012; Mucchielli 2008; Stenmark 2005; Westerberg 2004). A detailed summary of the reform parallels in the French and Swedish police will be presented in section 7.

## **6 DIFFERENCES IN DETAILS**

### **6.1 First wave: Decentralization**

At the start of NPM-induced reforms both France and Sweden experienced decentralization, which, with some delay, also influenced their police forces.

### 6.1.1 Sweden

In Sweden, the first wave of new public management reforms started in the late 1970s. Reforms focused on efficiency gains through increased decentralization, deregulation and de-bureaucratization as well as on consumer choice (Ibsen et al. 2011: 2304). As the defeat of the Social Democrats in 1976 was linked to their negative image in Swedish society with respect to bureaucracy, they introduced a reform of public administration with a focus on responsiveness and accessibility of public services to the citizens when they regained office in 1982. A series of service quality improvements based on principles of Total Quality Management were introduced in the mid-1980s. Decentralization, deregulation and de-bureaucratization was carried forward through the Social Democrats' government program in 1985 (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 308 f.).

In this context, increased urbanization, technical and economic developments, as well as a changed character of delinquency, induced a decentralization of the Swedish police forces in 1984/1985 by means of the Swedish police law<sup>7</sup> and a separate government bill.<sup>8</sup> Several police tasks were devolved and more autonomy in organizational questions was given to local police authorities. Each local unit obtained a budget without regulations on its use but with the obligation to report about its expenses to the Rikspolisstyrelsen. In this way the Rikspolisstyrelsen's influence declined and its role changed from a directing to a more supervisory agency (Westerberg 2004: 101 ff., 23 ff.) (Svensk Polis 05/1990, 10/1990, 01/1991). In order to facilitate the adaptation to the new decentralized autonomy, managers were trained accordingly. Furthermore, managerial means of evaluation were introduced (Svensk Polis 04/1991).

The main thrust of the reform of the community police (*närpolisreform*)<sup>9</sup> between 1989 and 1996 was to carry decentralization forward. Its main intention was to reorganize police work according to the principle of problem-orientation, that is, from a reactive and repressive to a preventive approach. The police reform was planned as a purely organisational reform without financial cost implications (Stenmark 2005: 53 ff.; Westerberg 2004: 123 ff.) (Svensk Polis 12/1993, 02/1995). In order to implement the

---

<sup>7</sup> Svensk författningssamling 1984:387, Polislag (1984:387), see [http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Lagar/Svenskförfattningssamling/Polislag-1984387\\_sfs-1984-387/?bet=1984:387](http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Lagar/Svenskförfattningssamling/Polislag-1984387_sfs-1984-387/?bet=1984:387).

<sup>8</sup> Regeringens proposition 1984/85:81, "Om polisens arbetsformer på lokal och regional nivå, utbildning och rekrytering", see [http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Propositioner-och-skrivelser/om-polisens-arbetsformer-pa-lo\\_G80381/?html=true](http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Propositioner-och-skrivelser/om-polisens-arbetsformer-pa-lo_G80381/?html=true).

<sup>9</sup> Regeringens proposition 1996/97:1D5, "Förslag till statsbudget för budgetåret 1997", see [http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Propositioner-och-skrivelser/Forslag-till-statsbudget-forb\\_GK031D5/?text=true](http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Propositioner-och-skrivelser/Forslag-till-statsbudget-forb_GK031D5/?text=true).

reform, the number of “contact officers” on the municipal level was increased at the expense of cuts in other fields of the police (Svensk Polis 04/1994). Due to these budgetary implications, the implementation of *närpolisreform* was opposed by employees from the beginning (Stenmark 2005: 53 ff.; Westerberg 2004: 123 ff.) (Polistidningen 09/1994).

The RPS regarded the new concept as successful and public opinion as expressed in public surveys on the new focus on cooperation and dialogue with citizens turned out to be favorable (Svensk Polis 10/1995). This assessment changed in 1997, when the RPS noticed criticism about the *närpolis*’ distance from the core of police work because it undertook too many tasks of which actually municipalities were in charge. The RPS continued expanding the community police because of its general success but announced to refocus the work on its core (Svensk Polis 06/1997, 01/1998, 10/1998).

Polisförbundet, however, had a different view of the success of the *närpolis*. From the employees’ perspective, the local police did not function as it was supposed to. A survey among the police forces showed that the local police authorities were not fulfilling the tasks they were assigned. They rather felt like a “pool of personnel” for all sorts of fields of police work such as riot containment or investigation. Nevertheless, the Polisförbundet supported the concept in principle and perceived an increase in budget as the solution to the aforementioned problems (Polistidningen 01/2000).

Budgetary problems in the beginning of the 2000s particularly affected the community police and aligned the RPS with Polisförbundet in their claim towards the government that additional police staff would be necessary in the local police to meet their own and citizens’ expectations (Svensk Polis 01/2001, 02/2001). As the local police was facing varying circumstances across the country, the organization was adjusted to the local circumstances (Svensk Polis 01/2001), taking into account the delinquency rate instead of the number of inhabitants (Svensk Polis 06/2001).

Despite some problems and necessary adjustments the *närpolis* continued being positively evaluated by the RPS. The fact that trust into the police was still high, even after social unrest in Gothenburg in 2001, was traced back to this concept (Svensk Polis 11/2001).

### **6.1.2 France**

In France, the first ideas inspired by the neoliberal perspective emerged in the 1980s within the elite of the Ministry of Finance (Hall 1986). Public sector corporatism was criticized but the legitimacy of the state itself was not questioned (Bézès 2007: 84; Clark 1998: 103; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 271; Rouban 2008). Concrete reforms have been initiated on a large scale since the early 1990s, primarily concerning decentralization. These reforms reorganized the relations between the central administration

and local units (Bézès 2007: 69). The new paradigm of state organization was also reflected in the state reform committees, mainly consisting of top senior civil servants, between 1989 and 1995. These committees proposed an encompassing reform of the state architecture, drawing on the separation of strategic from administrative functions, devolution of services and contractualization (Bézès 2007: 70 ff.).

The first wave of new public management reforms reached the French police in the end of the 1990s. Under the Jospin government, decentralization was adopted for the police by way of the concept of the *police de proximité*, which was put into place by the *Loi d'orientation pour la sécurité* of January 21, 1995.<sup>10</sup> This concept embodied a new strategy focusing on the relations between citizens and the police. Its intention was to increase the presence of the police in the public sphere and to renew working methods (Civique 03/1999)(Monjardet, Mouhanna and Chalom 2008; Roché 2005). The police forces were expected to change their working methods from a reactive to a pro-active and anticipating style. As part of a larger project this shift aimed at the creation of a new type of civil servant who would be more flexible and responsive to citizens, instead of concentrating on the delivery of documents and the application of rules. A new type of management, based on trust, was envisioned. This was to be achieved through decentralization of missions and more presence in the field. Also NPM instruments like management by objectives and evaluation were discussed to contribute to the attainment of this goal (Civique 02/2000, 03/2000, 08/2001). The new mode of action was tested in pilot projects and its generalization was communicated on the *assises nationales de la proximité* and through further communication attempts (Civique 03/2000, 04/2000, 12/2000). This concept was complemented by local partnerships for security (*contrats locaux de sécurité*) that enforced cooperation of police, gendarmerie, Ministry for Cities, Ministry for Youth and the local authorities (Civique 11/1999, 08/2001).

Trade unions reacted to the *police de proximité* in different ways. As can be expected from the political alignments between parties and trade unions, the leftist UNSA-Police supported the approach of the socialist government and still asked for after the UMP replaced the socialist party in government at the 2002 parliamentary elections (UP Magazine 11/2005). The rightist Alliance Police Nationale criticized the concept as being too vague and unsuitable for solving all security problems. In their opinion, orders were not clear enough, the extension of the concept to all hierarchical levels would have been necessary and the budget for the *police de proximité* was too small (Police Nationale 01/1999, 09/1999, 03/2000). Alliance demanded to increase personnel and budget instead of organizing the police according to the proximity concept (Police Nationale

---

<sup>10</sup> Loi n° 95-73 du 21 janvier 1995 d'orientation et de programmation relative à la sécurité, see <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000369046> (08/17/2013)

09/2000). In response, the ministry's attempts for cooperation and communication concerning the *police de proximité* were relatively strong (Civique 04/2000, 12/2000).

Altogether, the first wave of new public management reforms, consisting mainly of decentralization and the new proximity concept, was accompanied by modest cooperation efforts of the ministry and supported, respectively rejected, by the trade unions according to their political orientation. Nevertheless, as the UNSA-Police was the majoritarian police trade union at that time (Loubet del Bayle 2010: 165), it can be concluded that the concept of the *police de proximité* was rather accepted by the police workforce.

## **6.2 Second Wave: Performance measurement and budget reform**

### **6.2.1 Sweden**

The second reform wave in Sweden in the late 1980s and early 1990s was initiated by the right-wing government in 1991 and extended by the Social Democrats when they returned to power in 1994. The focus of the reforms shifted from democratic participation and decentralisation to a focus on the budget with privatisation as a central issue. The main objective of these reforms was to reduce public service expenditure by 10 percent through efficiency gains, downsizing and merging of different agencies. The aim was to liberalize public services and to increase consumer choice by competition. Working time practices became more flexible and the fixed salary grade system was replaced by individual performance- and qualification-related pay schemes according to a new public staff policy.<sup>11</sup> Measures such as results-oriented management, frame appropriations and accruals accounting were introduced in all government organizations from 1988 and replaced traditional Swedish planning. Since 1993, all agencies in central government had to publish annual performance reports. In 1996 the budget process was reformed by a new budget law.<sup>12</sup> This reform process continued into the 2000s, enforcing performance orientation and detailed evaluation. As the Social Democrats abandoned their opposition to privatization over time, thirteen agencies became public companies between 1990 and 1996. Decentralization was carried forward by further devolution and, accordingly, more autonomy to the municipalities in spending central government grants. Autonomy was, in turn, restricted by tight frame budgets. Also, collective bargaining became more decentralized (Hemerijck, Huiskamp and de Boer 2002: 55 ff.; Ibsen et al. 2011: 2304 f., 8; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 308 f.; Premfors 1998: 150 f.).

---

<sup>11</sup> Motion 1990/91:A603, "Statlig personalpolitik", see [http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Motioner/mot-199091A603-Statlig-perso\\_GE02A603/?text=true](http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Motioner/mot-199091A603-Statlig-perso_GE02A603/?text=true).

<sup>12</sup> Regeringens proposition 1995/96:220, "Lag om statsbudgeten", see [http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Propositioner-och-skrivelser/Lag-om-statsbudgeten\\_GJ03220/?text=true](http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Propositioner-och-skrivelser/Lag-om-statsbudgeten_GJ03220/?text=true).

In the Swedish police the new budget focus translated into intensified pressure to increase efficiency and to reduce personnel costs in the 1990s (Svensk Polis 01/1990, 02/1990). This was reflected in a shift to output-orientation as a guiding principle, a new budget and planning system, as well as centralizations as a means to reduce costs. Furthermore, personnel was cut which first led to deteriorated working conditions and dissatisfaction among the employees which stimulated increased cooperation efforts by the *Rikspolisstyrelsen*.

### *Performance management*

In order to measure efficiency of police work the Swedish police used three main statistical indicators which were the clarification (Svensk Polis 03/1991) and delinquency rate (Svensk Polis 03/1998, 02/1999), as well as – unlike in France – citizens' trust into the police (Svensk Polis 06/1998, 04/2004, Polistidningen 02/2004). The practice of documenting past crime was criticized by the Swedish police trade union as an inappropriate basis for pro-active and preventive police work. In their opinion this could not replace clear objectives which were necessary in order to improve effectiveness (Svensk Polis 03/1991, Polistidningen 04/1991, 08/1991). In consequence, statistical measures were used deliberately and the influence of external factors was taken into account (Svensk Polis 03/1998, 02/1999).

### *Centralization*

As another potential means to reduce costs, the Swedish parliament decided to examine the central police organization and possibilities for centralization (Svensk Polis 12/1993).<sup>13</sup> This measure resulted in a decrease of the number of regional police authorities from 118 to 70 (Svensk Polis 04/1994, 06/1994). This process was supported by Polisförbundet as it acknowledged the necessity of cost reductions (Polistidningen 07/1993, 03/1996). On this occasion Polisförbundet also encouraged flattening hierarchies and increasing authority of police staff (Polistidningen 10/1995). In the course of centralization, the agencies also obtained the responsibility for employers' issues in 1995 (Polistidningen 04/1995).

At the end of 1998, the number of police departments was reduced again to 21.<sup>14</sup> This reduction was meant to contribute to sustaining the positive financial developments of the police and to set free resources for the actual police work (Svensk Polis 08/1998,

---

<sup>13</sup> Kommittédirektiv 1994:19, "Utredning om den centrala polisorganisationen m.m.", see [http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utredningar/Kommittedirektiv/Utredning-om-den-centrala-poli\\_GIB119/](http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utredningar/Kommittedirektiv/Utredning-om-den-centrala-poli_GIB119/).

<sup>14</sup> Kommittédirektiv 1997:121, "Översyn av polisväsendets ledningsorganisation", see [http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utredningar/Kommittedirektiv/versyn-av-polisvasendets-ledn\\_GLB1121/](http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utredningar/Kommittedirektiv/versyn-av-polisvasendets-ledn_GLB1121/).

12/2002). In addition, from 1999 onwards the regional governments did not have any influence on the police departments any more (Svensk Polis 12/1998). As the reductions of the number of police departments went along with increased autonomy and modified requirements of managers in the police, managers were offered to attend vocational re-training (Svensk Polis 06/1997, 11/1998).

In 2002, also the centralization of police management and administration was planned and subject of the so-called *Polisriksdag* on which police representatives, trade unionists and politicians come together on a yearly basis. Through this centralization the police work was to be focused on its core (Svensk Polis 12/2002) as demanded by the employees' representatives five years earlier (Svensk Polis 06/1997).

### *New budget and planning system*

With regard to budgeting, we observe a trend of decentralization of responsibility. In 1992, a new budget and planning system was introduced which also affected the police.<sup>15</sup> The managers on the municipal and regional levels obtained more responsibility (Svensk Polis 06/1992). These reorganizations aimed at increasing efficiency and decreasing costs (Svensk Polis 11/1992). The police budget was planned for a period of three years, decreasing costs by 5 percent of the whole police budget (Polistidningen 07/1993). The Polisförbundet supported the new budget and planning system because it also entailed an encompassing analysis of police work, which it claimed to have demanded for a long time (Polistidningen 05/1992). In their opinion, however, the establishment of an office charged with reporting results to the government, does not contribute to effectiveness of police work (Polistidningen 01/1993).

During that period Polisförbundet's attention was focused on budget restraints and possible personnel cuts. The trade union asked for transparency of cost reduction plans and called for a discussion on working conditions which it claimed to have tightened (Polistidningen 06/1992, 10/1992, 07/1993). As the rationalizations entailed a technocratization of the police management, Polisförbundet aimed at concluding a comprehensive agreement on personnel policy in order to keep relations between employer and employees 'human' (Polistidningen 06/1994). Two years later, the concerns of Polisförbundet turned out to have been well-founded as the new Rikspolischef announced that personnel costs had to be reduced (Svensk Polis 03/1996, 05/1996). In the same year, the RPS was granted greater autonomy to decide on the allocation of its budget through

---

<sup>15</sup> Regeringens proposition 1991/92:52, "Regional ledningsorganisation inom polisen", see [http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Propositioner-och-skrivelser/Regional-ledningsorganisation-\\_GF0352/?html=true](http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Propositioner-och-skrivelser/Regional-ledningsorganisation-_GF0352/?html=true).

the budget law (Svensk Polis 10/1996),<sup>16</sup> which led to a loss of 1000 to 1500 jobs in the Swedish civil service (Svensk Polis 12/1996). As reductions in staff were inevitable, Polisförbundet demanded that these redundancies would at least not affect young police officers (Polistidningen 05/1996, 07/1996, 08/1997). Nevertheless, according to Polisförbundet personnel cuts had a negative effect on the operational police work. It demanded a better working climate in which representatives of the workforce participated in the process of decision making. Furthermore, the trade union called for an end of the hiring freeze. In that respect, the Polisförbundet intended to conclude an agreement on personnel policies and working conditions in the following year (Polistidningen 10/1996).

### *Cooperation of RPS and Polisförbundet*

While the RPS still executed personnel cuts in the beginning of the year 1997, it started taking a more favorable stance towards police employees from the end of 1996 onwards. It concluded a collective bargaining agreement with Polisförbundet that guaranteed certain working standards. Nevertheless, this agreement was rejected by the Swedish National Audit Office (*Riksrevisionsverket*, RRV), alleging the RPS of incompetence. Polisförbundet criticized that the RRV was biased towards the employers' side and insisted on the maintenance of working standards (Polistidningen 07/1996). In 1997, the RPS formulated the demand towards the government to take back planned cost reductions for the police in order to make the police more efficient and to extend the local police (Svensk Polis 03/1997). The budget of the police was subsequently topped up, but in the opinion of the Rikspolisstyrelsen the amount was still too small to cover all expenses. In order to ensure effective police work, productivity was to be increased through new methods, new technology, qualifications and a change in working time regulations (Svensk Polis 10/1997). By the end of 1997, the RPS again expressed its comprehension for the employees' perspective. Despite a positive development in real wages, 1997 was characterized by job losses in the police forces, budget deficits and discontent among the employees (Svensk Polis 12/1997). Employees were dissatisfied with the changes of their work because they affected the level of trust within the police forces. According to a survey of Statistics Sweden, many employees distrusted the heads of the police departments and reported a severed working climate (Statistiska Centralbyrån, SCB) (Polistidningen 03/1998).

At the end of 1998, the Polisförbundet elected a new president. With the new president also Polisförbundet expressed its intention to change the climate within the police

---

<sup>16</sup> Regeringens proposition 1995/96:220, "Lag om statsbudgeten", see [http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Propositioner-och-skrivelser/Lag-om-statsbudgeten\\_GJ03220/?text=true](http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Propositioner-och-skrivelser/Lag-om-statsbudgeten_GJ03220/?text=true).

and between employer and employees. A long-term perspective in employment relations was to be taken and democracy within the police to be increased (Polistidningen 10/1998).

From 1999 onwards, the RPS shifted away from discussions about budget and organizational restructuring. Instead it focused more on working methods and strengthened internal cooperation as demanded by Polisförbundet (Svensk Polis 05/1999, 10/2000). In order to gain insights into the daily police work, Rikspolischef Sten Heckscher visited all police departments. He stressed the importance of exchanging views and his intention to increase satisfaction and acceptance of reforms among the employees and he promised to improve the implementation of reforms (Svensk Polis 05/1999, 10/1999, 11/2001). Internal decisions were to be communicated in a better way (Svensk Polis 10/1999). Moreover, the RPS demanded the government to keep its promise to increase the police budget in order to hire additional personnel (Svensk Polis 10/1999).

Even though Polisförbundet regarded the cooperation with RPS and other authorities as deficient (Polistidningen 01/2000, 03/2001), it actually successfully enforced its demands in collective bargaining to an extent that the agreement caused a budgetary deficit (Svensk Polis 01/2000). This led to a negative budget which the RPS asked the government to compensate through a budget increase in the following three years (Svensk Polis 02/2000). The police was subsequently granted a lump-sum payment, as well as additional personnel (Polistidningen 06/2000). Furthermore Polisförbundet also achieved the conclusion of a cooperation agreement on increased employee participation in development and decision making (Polistidningen 02/2000).

This “era of cooperation” and employee-friendly behavior of the RPS ended in 2003. The head of the Stockholm police department, Gunnar Gunmo, was asked by the Rikspolischef to resign from his position because he concluded a local collective bargaining agreement that would have had a negative effect on the financial situation of the police and thus for the functioning of the whole police. Thereby, he infringed the cooperation agreement (Svensk Polis 05/2003). This caused a crisis in the relations between RPS and the Polisförbundet. The RPS criticized the Polisförbundet for its conversational tone during the conflict caused by the forced resignation of the Rikspolischef. The tensions reached a peak when Polisförbundet announced that it no longer felt bound to its contractual peace obligation in this case (Svensk Polis 06/2003, Polisförbundet 03/2003).

### **6.2.2 France**

In the 2000s, the desire to rehabilitate the state apparatus was widely shared among French elites (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 273). Due to public deficits and raising debts NPM reforms were back on the agenda in 2002. The re-election of Jacques Chirac as

president and the election of Jean-Pierre Raffarin as prime minister spurred a renewed interest in liberal reforms (Rouban 2007: 474).

One of the major new public management reforms, the budget reform *Loi organique relative aux lois de finances* (LOLF)<sup>17</sup> was enacted in 2001. Its intention was to decrease the budget deficit, which had doubled from 1991 to 1995, and to increase budgetary control of the parliament. In brief, it consisted of budgeting and performance measurement and was directed at increasing executives' accountability for budget. Planning became strategic, containing annual performance plans, target formulation and evaluation. Before the LOLF, deputies voted on the budgetary plans of all ministries at once. Evaluation of policy objectives and expenditures were not envisaged, and the parliament did not obtain budgetary oversight. Furthermore, transfers of funds across budgets were eased within certain limits. The LOLF allocated the budget according to programs which were defined in much broader terms than the old budgetary chapters. Moreover, it enabled transfers of funds across expenditure categories within programs. As staff cuts could be spent on non-staff items, whereas the reverse was not possible, the LOLF produced one-sided incentives to reduce staff costs. The new flexibility in budget allocation also allowed for shifting jobs between corps. Furthermore, the LOLF introduced a budgetary requirement formulating objectives of each program as well as a set of performance indicators (Cole 2010: 350 f.). The implementation of the LOLF from 2006 onwards served as a vehicle for internal changes like the increased use of human resource management techniques, and accelerated the whole reform process. Power of managers was devolved and performance-related bonuses and pay for high-level bureaucrats were introduced (Bordogna and Neri 2011: 2323; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 276; Rouban 2008). The ongoing will to modernize the state was manifested in the establishment of a new directorate of state modernisation (*Direction Générale de la Modernisation de l'État*) in 2005 (Bordogna and Neri 2011: 2323).

#### *“Politique du chiffre”*

The new government and Nicolas Sarkozy as the new Minister of the Interior affected police policies in a substantial way. Although NPM instruments had already been briefly discussed in the police until then, Sarkozy accelerated their implementation and asked the police workforce for dedication to the upcoming reforms (Civique 06/2002). First, however, Sarkozy only turned away from the preceding police policy of the *police de proximité*. He increased personnel and technical equipment and merged the police and the gendarmerie by means of the *Loi d'orientation et de programmation pour la*

---

<sup>17</sup> Loi organique n° 2001-692 du 1 août 2001 relative aux lois de finances <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/afichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000394028>

*sécurité intérieure* (LOPSI).<sup>18</sup> This law also contained increased repression of delinquency and crime (Civique 08/2002). One year later, Sarkozy established a culture of results and evaluation, the so-called *politique du chiffre*. As *commissaires* faced increased demands of flexibility, adaptability and responsibility they were collectively promoted on the salary scale to category A (Civique 08/2003). Only three months after the introduction of the results culture, the Ministry of the Interior celebrated declining delinquency and an increasing clarification rate. These indicators were to improve further and Sarkozy announced to reward good performance with bonuses (*prime aux résultats exceptionnel*), as well as career opportunities (Civique 11/2003).

### “Réforme de corps et carrières”

In 2004, after numerous meetings of the interlocutors, Dominique Villepin as Minister of the Interior and the police trade unions signed the *protocole d'accord sur la réforme des corps et carrières de la police nationale* of June 17, 2004. This reform aimed at increasing efficiency by reorganizing the Corps according to their responsibilities and competencies, as well as by training managerial capacities. The reform primarily revaluated the corps of police chiefs and officers (*corps de commissaires et officiers*) and equipped it with more competencies. Moreover, trade unions succeeded in adding elements improving wage categories and administrative procedures and adding a new policy of employee motivation that took individual qualifications into account and a revised system of evaluation (Ministère de l'intérieur 2004)(UP Magazine 02/2004). Nevertheless, the demanded classification of category *B spéciale* from *gardiens de la paix* apprentices onwards and a renegotiation of the retirement reform was not included in the protocol (UP Magazine supplement 04/2004). Also disagreement on the performance bonuses persisted, which the UP suspected the Ministry of the Interior to trade for cuts in pay (UP Magazine 09/2004).

UNSA-Police and Alliance, who signed the protocol, both defended the distribution of the high reform budget of 365 million euros to only a small number of their members. UNSA-Police justified this with the total sum (*enveloppe globale*) of the offer, which comprised salary improvements for *brigadiers* who were designated for promotion, as well as for 650 *gardiens de la paix* (UP Magazine 12/2004, 04/2005). At the same time, UP criticized the division of the *corps d'encadrement et d'application* into *gardiens de la paix* and *gradés*. In the following, UP wanted to renegotiate the salary of the *gardiens de la paix* and maintain their special status of a *métier difficile* (UP Magazine 04/2005). Alliance admitted that the reform was only favorable for the *gradés* and

---

<sup>18</sup> LOI n° 2002-1094 du 29 août 2002 d'orientation et de programmation pour la sécurité intérieure (1), <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000780288&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id>

not for the *gardiens* but argued that the *gardiens* would become *gradés* at one point. The reform was made for young police officers who were willing to fully commit themselves to their job. Personal investment was privileged over a “wait-and-see” attitude (Police Nationale 2<sup>o</sup>/2004). Later on, Alliance claimed the authorship of the reform, labelling it as an inevitable evolution of the institution (Police Nationale 3<sup>o</sup>/2004).

#### *Continuation of “politique du chiffre” under Villepin and Sarkozy*

The performance-oriented reforms initiated under Sarkozy were continued and strengthened under Villepin as Minister of the Interior between 2004 and 2005 until Sarkozy came back into office. Results of the representatives of each department were measured monthly and discussed publicly (Civique 05/2004, 07/2004). When Sarkozy came back to office in 2005, he stressed again his intention to change the culture of the police toward performance orientation. The Ministry of the Interior also started to define targets that should be attained within a certain period of time. From the ministry’s perspective, the results of this policy were always described in positive formulations, and clarification and delinquency rates were claimed to improve continuously (Civique 11/2003, 07/2005, 03/2006, 08/2006). Sarkozy ascribed the positive developments to his reform policies like the *réforme de corps et carrières*, occupational re-training and structural reorganizations (Civique 08/2006).

While UNSA-Police still cooperated on the *réforme de corps et carrières*, their position turned into critique and open opposition of the government policies. The trade union criticized a lack of cooperation from the beginning (UP Magazine 09/2003). Already at a very early stage, UNSA-Police opposed the police statistics and criticized that they were imprecise and inflated. In their opinion, the police should have a long-term perspective and not focus on quantifiable aspects. They alleged that statistics are misused for a communicative coup by the Minister of the Interior and that their profession was manipulated (UP Magazine 07/2005, 11/2006). In order to respond to citizens’ expectations, UP repeatedly demanded an increase in personnel and a return to the concept of the proximity police. The statistics policy is referred to as a policy of the tally sheet (*politique de la bâtonnite*) (UP Magazine 11/2005, 11/2006, 04/2007).

Alliance took a different stance towards the *politique du chiffre*. Even though Alliance criticized the relatively moderate use of delinquency statistics when the socialist party was still in office as not corresponding to the reality of the *policiers de terrain* (Police Nationale 07/2000), they ceased expressing critical statements as soon as Sarkozy became Interior Minister. Alliance aimed at becoming the primary interlocutor and put forward their policy recommendations to Sarkozy (Police Nationale 2<sup>o</sup>/2001). Alliance was successful. While UNSA-Police was still the main interlocutor in the preparatory phase of the protocol on the *réforme de corps et carrières* in 2001, Alliance soon perceived itself as taking the role of the majoritarian trade union without having the

majority (Police Nationale 2°/2003, 3°/2003). Furthermore, Alliance's demands were fulfilled. They claimed authorship of the establishment of a big Ministry of the Interior in charge of both gendarmerie and police, an increase in personnel and financial means and reforms of internal structures (Police Nationale 3°/2002). Despite slight criticism with regard to a simple increase in pay without according organizational reforms (Police Nationale 4°/2004), Alliance supported all policies of the Interior Ministry and did not criticize Sarkozy and Villepin for their *politique du chiffre*. Their demands were limited to better (performance-related) pay for the *gardiens de la paix* (AP Magazine 12/2005, 06/2006).

Also in 2005, due to social unrest in the French banlieues, Sarkozy established the *sécurité de proximité* which consisted of sending mobile police forces to sensitive areas in order to “reconquer the territory” (Civique 11/2005). Increased repression (that came along with the new statistics policy) also had an impact on working conditions. In UNSA-Police's opinion, the “zero tolerance” principle was only a theoretical and not realistic concept and was seen as a major cause of the riots in the suburbs of 2005. UP criticized that the police was the only actor to tackle the social and delinquent dimension of this problem. The police had to do the “dirty job” (*sale boulot*) in particularly explosive working conditions. Accordingly, UNSA-Police asked for more personnel (UP Magazine 11/2005, 11/2006, 04/2007).

## **6.3 Third wave: Intensification of performance management**

### **6.3.1 Sweden**

After a phase of low reform activity, the third wave in Sweden started with the newly elected right-wing government in 2006. Its main focus was the privatisation of public companies and public service quality. In order to strengthen the focus on and responsiveness to citizens, e-government was introduced and transparency increased (Ibsen et al. 2011: 2305). Although the Reinfeldt government stressed that services that can be provided by the private market should not be provided by the state, no high-profile, large-scale public management reform programs have been initiated since 2000 (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 309).

In the Swedish police, the reforms of the third wave contained mainly the intensification of results-orientation. As a Swedish idiosyncrasy, towards the end of the 2000's these statistics also took qualitative aspects such as citizens' trust into account. Nevertheless, and despite increases in personnel and budget, dissatisfaction in the workforce grew and cooperation between the Polisförbundet and RPS became more tensed.

### *Output-orientation*

As the police was criticized in public for lack of efficiency, the newly appointed Rikspolischef Stefan Strömberg extended the reporting of statistics, introduced a system of result evaluation and established a controlling department (Svensk Polis 02/2005, 03/2005, 11/2005, 12/2005). Statistics were discussed annually in the Svensk Polis magazine and revealed mixed results. The number of complaints first decreased in 2006 (Svensk Polis 06/2006, 01/2007) but increased again in 2007, which was regarded as a defeat. Also the delinquency rate showed mixed results. The RPS urged the police to improve the statistical figures – especially given the increased number of police officers in the field (Svensk Polis 05/2007, 10/2007, 01/2008, 02/2008, 01/2010). Even though the statistics showed better results for 2008 and 2009 due to results-oriented working methods,<sup>19</sup> RPS continued to demand increased effectiveness and better results (Svensk Polis 02/2009, 09/2009, 12/2009). For this matter concrete objectives were formulated (Svensk Polis 01/2010).

Even though the focus on statistics became stronger, the Swedish police also took “soft indicators” into account. Although the RPS initially questioned the adequacy of measuring consumer satisfaction in the police and comparing the results with other public institutions in the *Svenskt Kvalitetsindex* (Svensk Polis 01/2007), it took citizens’ perception of the police into account, based on indicators of citizens’ trust into the police, satisfaction with its work and their sense of security (Svensk Polis 02/2010, 04/2011). The Polisförbundet only expressed its dissatisfaction about the need to prove its effectiveness and productivity with statistics from 2011 onwards, when the government once more asked for further efficiency gains. It rejected the focus on sheer numbers and criticized the method of measuring the success of police work by the number of processed cases per 1.500 hours of investigation (Polistidningen 02/2011). It demanded a better balance between qualitative and quantitative objectives (Polistidningen 10/2011). Subsequently, an encompassing evaluation of the police was conducted in 2011, which took both quantitative and qualitative aspects into account. The result was that trust into the police increased continuously, while the clarification rate and the number of investigations forwarded to prosecution fell. In order to counter this development the Rikspolischef made concrete suggestions such as a greater reliance on experienced employees (Svensk Polis 11/2011, 06/2012).

---

<sup>19</sup> That is the Police Intelligence Methodology (*PUM*) and the Police National Investigation routine (*PNU*) (Borglund and Nuldén 2006).

*Increases, dissatisfaction and cooperation*

During the third wave Polisförbundet did not cease asking for better working conditions and pay. These demands were partly granted by the RPS, as well as personnel increases. These increases came along with even higher pressure of the RPS on the workforce to improve investigation results though.

The budget, wages and personnel were increased from 2006 to 2010 and the budget was increased again in 2012 (Svensk Polis 11/2006, 05/2007, 01/2008, Polistidningen 04/2008, 11/2012). Field police officers were given more autonomy and responsibility in the execution of their work and investigations (Svensk Polis 05/2007, 01/2008). Managers who complained about insufficient time for managerial tasks, were given more time and were offered further education and mentors by the RPS (Svensk Polis 04/2007, 11/2007).

During this period Polisförbundet noticed that employers lost interest in cooperating with employees. Nevertheless, it assumed that its influence had increased in the past. It expressed its will for compromises through cooperation although it accepted the final prerogative to decide on the part of the employer (Polistidningen 05/2006). Polisförbundet would defend existing standards and aim at achieving further improvements (Polistidningen 09/2010, 12/2010). The election of the new Rikspolischef Bengt Svensson in 2008 was explicitly welcomed (Polistidningen 06/2008). The Polisförbundets' claims for better working conditions, an agreement on (more flexible) working times and a higher entry-level wage did not receive a response from RPS (Polistidningen 02/2011, 06/2011, 09/2011, 10/2011, 06/2012).

For this reason the negotiations for a renewal of the central agreement on wages in the public sector (RALS-agreement) turned out to be very difficult (Polistidningen 04/2011). Nevertheless an agreement on a coherent Swedish police<sup>20</sup> which entailed the centralization of the police authorities from January 1, 2013 onwards was enacted after short discussion and with support of the police departments and municipalities (Svensk Polis 10/2012, 09/2012). Also the Polisförbundet claimed authorship of the agreement (Polistidningen 01/2012, 05/2012).

With regard to working conditions, working time and the police culture of leadership, dissatisfaction was still on the rise (Svensk Polis 10/2012). This was responded by efforts of the RPS to increase cooperation. Rikspolischef Bengt Svensson promised to take the employees' needs seriously and attended the annual congress of the Polisförbundet. In the following, a central agreement of wages was concluded (Polistidningen

---

<sup>20</sup> Statens Offentliga Utredningar 2012:13, "En sammanhållen svensk polis", see <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/18/97/45/685d81a1.pdf>.

10/2012). Also the demand for a higher administrative budget due to time consuming statistics was granted (Polistidningen 11/2012).

### *Outlook*

In Sweden, new public management policies were carried forward both by left-wing and right-wing governments. As they were introduced in a more consensual policy style, involving employees and their representation, there was no strong opposition against NPM inspired reforms. Only the centralization of the police forces and the shift towards the inclusion of more “soft indicators” into the performance management tools such as citizens’ trust and sense of security led to reservation (Svensk Polis 11/2011, 06/2012).

### **6.3.2 France**

In 2007, reforms in France took on a new quality with the general public policies review<sup>21</sup> (*révision générale des politiques publiques*, RGPP)(Bordogna and Neri 2011: 2323; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 275). Inspired by a report of the Ministry of Economics on public debts (Pebereau 2005) the RGPP was enacted in order to reduce the public deficit. The RGPP aimed at promoting economy and efficiency in the public service. All government ministries and public sector organisations were asked to develop their own measures of efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, in contrast to the LOLF, the RGPP had a direct impact on the central government departments and their field services. Its main aim was to replace only one retired servant in two. The savings were to be used in equal shares to reduce public debt and to reward performance. Furthermore, the policy entailed territorial decentralisation, a reform of the system of the corps and the introduction of a clearer civil service career structure (Cole 2010: 351-4).

When Sarkozy was elected prime minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie became his successor. Her program consisted of technological modernization, the creation of *unités de sécurisation* on the interdepartmental or zone level, stronger cooperation of police and gendarmerie and a stop in job cuts among the *gardiens de la paix* for 2008 (Civique 11/2007). Furthermore, the LOPSI (*Loi d’orientation et de programmation pour la performance de la sécurité*) was continued and engendered again increased repression of delinquency and crime by video surveillance and better endowment with weapons and IT technology (Civique 12/2007). Soon after, the RGPP was enacted which resulted in a reduction of the number of civil servants for the police (Civique 05/2008). A multi-year

---

<sup>21</sup> Conseil des ministres du 20 juin 2007, La revue générale des politiques publiques, [http://archives.gouvernement.fr/fillon\\_version2/gouvernement/la-revue-generale-des-politiques-publiques.html](http://archives.gouvernement.fr/fillon_version2/gouvernement/la-revue-generale-des-politiques-publiques.html), specified by the prime minister on July 10, 2007.

budget plan was introduced and further steps of reorganization and rationalization were announced. Part of the reorganization was the transfer of the gendarmerie from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of the Interior from 2009 onwards (Civique 12/2008). The report of the police statistics remained an integral part of the ministry's communication. The indicators of delinquency and clarification rate continued to develop in a positive way (Civique 03/2009).

In 2007, UNSA-Police was still discussing the concept of the *police de proximité*. Even if its generalization was considered a “disaster” in the past, UP still supported a close dialogue with the population (UP Magazine 04/2007). They saw this demand realized in the new minister's program (UP Magazine 10/2007). Their claim for better pay and working conditions for the *gardiens de la paix*, however, passed unnoticed (UP Magazine 12/2007). According to UP, the integration of police and gendarmerie is at the expense of the police. They criticized the ministry's reluctant position in collective bargaining and demanded paid overwork. In view of the resilient position of the ministry, their initial will to cooperation turned into an open threat of protest (UP Magazine 03/2008).

The relations between the trade unions and the Interior Ministry reached a low point in 2008. As a consequence, UNSA-Police, SGP-FO and Alliance joined forces in order to improve police employees' worsening situation, consisting of a loss of purchasing power due to inflation, low public salaries of the salary category C close to the minimum wage (SMIC) and an increasing disparity between the salary levels within the police. Also working conditions were endangered because of the decrease in workforce due to the RGPP (UP Magazine 09/2008). Even if the premises were favorable, the negotiations of the trade unions with the Administration were unsuccessful from the UP's point of view. The negotiations were conducted exclusively by Alliance and therefore considered pointless from the perspective of UNSA-Police. The result was a twofold plan, which consisted of a drastic reduction of the workforce and entailed a deterioration of working conditions and a decreased budget as an austerity measure. The only, modest, improvement was an increase of the travel and accommodation allowances (*allocation de maîtrise*). The *gardiens de la paix* and *gradés* perceived themselves as the scapegoat of the reform and expected a further deterioration of their working conditions (UP Magazine 11/2008). This frustration culminated in a demonstration in 2009 in which the UP demanded a revaluation of the salary for *gardiens de la paix* according to the category B, compensation for a loss of purchasing power, higher pensions, overwork accounts and parity between police and gendarmerie with regard to travel and accommodation allowances. At the same time, the UP was pessimistic about future negotiations (UP Magazine 06/2009).

Also Alliance criticized the working conditions and demanded the revalorization of the basic salaries and the creation of new salary levels (*échelons*) for the *gardiens de la paix*, bonuses for loyalty (*prime de fidélisation*) and the approximation of accommodation allowances of police and gendarmerie. At the same time, Alliance did not attack managerial and organizational reforms and participated in the preparation of the LOPSI (Police Nationale 06/2007, 12/2007). In contrast to the UP, the cooperation with UNSA-Police and the SGP-FO in 2008 was perceived as a success by Alliance. They celebrated the increase of purchasing power due to an increase of two times 10 percent of the *allocation de maîtrise* which they claimed as their achievement (Police Nationale 07/2008, 10/2008, 12/2008, UP Magazine 11/2008). Contrary to former demands for performance-related promotions (Police Nationale 09/2000), Alliance criticized that the *gradés* and *gardiens de la paix* were the only corps that had to complete numerous exams in their career (Police Nationale 10/2008). Furthermore, Alliance tried to renegotiate the salary according to *catégorie B* and further adjustments of the salary scale, but remained unsuccessful in this attempt (Police Nationale 03/2009, 12/2009).

#### *Slight distancing from new management practices*

In 2009, Alliot-Marie complemented management reforms with a citizen focus. The ministry organized more than 1200 meetings with the French population in order to exchange views on ways to improve the relation between police and citizens (Civique 05/2009). Alliot-Marie also sent more police forces into the field and therefore increased the number of specialized territorial units (*unités territoriales de quartier*, UTeQ). In addition, the local partnerships of gendarmerie, police, judges, elected representatives, associations and teachers were reinvigorated (Civique 06/2009).

In 2009, the Ministry of Interior under Brice Hortefeux faced the first stagnation in the delinquency rate after seven years of decline. In response, Hortefeux initiated a reorganization in the division of tasks and responsibilities between police and gendarmerie (Civique 10/2009). One year later, police statistics improved (Civique 01/2010). In the same year, the ministry proclaimed that for the sixth time in a row the statistics were showing declining delinquency (Civique 05/2010). At the end of the Sarkozy government the ministry claimed that delinquency had decreased throughout the last 10 years (Civique 03/2012).

In 2009, UNSA-Police merged with the SGP-FO and became Unité Police due to a change in collective bargaining regulation which ruled that from then on, only a single trade union representing at least 50 percent of the electorate was able to oppose an agreement (UP Magazine 12/2009). In the following elections Unité Police achieved the majority in the national (*Commissions administratives paritaires nationales*, CAPN), as well as the absolute respectively relative majority in almost all interdepartmental joint administrative commissions (*Commissions administratives paritaires interdépartementales*).

mentale, CAPI). According to Unité Police the administration benefited from a fragmented trade union landscape and the absence of a majoritarian interlocutor since the early 1990s. Having gained new force, the secretary general of Unité Police criticized the reduction in the number of civil servants by the RGPP for being unsuitable at a time when violence against the police was at its peak (UP Magazine 02/2010, 06/2011). Also the *politique du chiffre* was argued not to solve any problems. UP insisted on renegotiating the equivalent category B for the *gardiens de la paix* instead (UP Magazine 03/2010). A proposal of the Interior Ministry for a *protocole d'accord* on a new salary scale was rejected by Alliance (Police Nationale 06/2010). In the end, after formulating its demand for more than six years and despite the economic crisis, the UP concluded an agreement on the equivalence of the category B for the *policiers de terrain* by 2011 (UP Magazine 03/2010). This success increased the UPs readiness to combat for the abolishment of the RGPP which they claimed to have merely led to work overload and stress, increase of overtime and further discrepancies (UP Magazine 06/2011, 09/2011).

From 2009 onwards, also Alliance increased their pressure on the Ministry of the Interior. They opposed the planned decrease in workforce and expressed their skepticism about the statistics used to measure performance (Police Nationale 06/2009, 10/2009). By the end of 2009, their skepticism turned to open opposition. They condemned statistics as useless and as a simple means for career enhancement (Police Nationale 12/2009). In 2011, Alliance openly asked for the abolishment of the RGPP. Furthermore, they demanded to refocus police work on its core tasks and to increase police presence in a sustainable way (Police Nationale 06/2011) and deplored the workload generated by the documentation requirements for evaluating performance (Police Nationale 12/2011). In spring 2012, this anger culminated in a demonstration (Police Nationale 06/2012).

### Outlook

Since 2012 the *Parti Socialiste* (PS) is in office again in France. Alliance observed the election of the socialist party without excitement. They evaluated the new Minister Manuel Valls as capable (Police Nationale 10/2012). After the elections the strengthened Unité Police basically demanded complete renunciation from former policies. UP demanded to change managerial policies that put permanent pressure on the territorial police, to abolish the *politique du chiffre*, as well as the RGPP because it allegedly only caused dysfunctions in the police. If the government would not do so, the UP was ready to turn to a hostile attitude (UP Magazine 03/2012, 06/2012). As the Unité Police is closer to the PS than Alliance, it can be expected that they will now aim at becoming the only primary interlocutor again. First evidence shows that the new government acts in their interest.

Shortly after Unité Police formulated its demands, a return to pre-NPM policies can be observed in the police. The new Minister of the Interior, Manuel Valls, announced to be more attentive to the working conditions in the police and to put a new *sécurité de proximité* into place. Also the number of personnel in the police and gendarmerie was to be increased, especially among the *gardiens de la paix*. Valls gave a clear signal that he would discontinue the *politique de chiffre* by announcing that statistics would not any more be used without restraint. Valls stopped the statistical practices and set up a project to examine the reliability and trustworthiness of the public statistics on delinquency (Civique 05/2012, 10/2012, UP 09/2012).

## **7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

We have argued that the implementation of cost-cutting and NPM inspired reforms in the police forces is conditioned on the policy style of the government and its agents, on the one hand, and the organizational structure of the trade union movement on the other hand. We now reconsider our hypotheses in view of the collected material.

First of all we find *strong parallels* in the reform developments for Sweden and France. Both countries experienced three reform waves: The first wave consisted of decentralization and devolution, combined with the introduction of a proximity police. In the second wave, both countries widely abandoned the policies of the first wave and turned to policies of performance management and output-orientation, as well as centralization. In the third wave, governments renounced from their former performance management policies respectively complemented them by the introduction of qualitative measurements. Nevertheless, the described parallels did not occur synchronically. The first two waves first occurred in Sweden and only with a delay of approximately ten years in France. The third wave took place nearly at the same time in both countries as France renounced its performance management policies more quickly.

Furthermore, in both countries scarce resources were one of the main drivers behind new public management reforms and also one of the main topics negotiated between trade unions and employers. Even though decentralization and deregulation in the first reform wave in Sweden entailed a budget reform which first just led to a deregulation of budget spending (Westerberg 2004: 101 ff., 23 ff.) which was not primarily driven by budgetary concerns, the budgetary deficit became a main focus of negotiations between Polisförbundet and RPS in the second reform wave. This led to the introduction of a new budget and planning system that focused on output-orientation in 1992. Also centralization was used as a means to reduce costs in the following years. The budgetary pressure could not be fully compensated by new management methods and increased efficiency. This led to conflicts of interest between employees and employer.

Table 4: Reform waves in Sweden and France at the sectoral level

| Wave        | Sweden    |  | France         |   |
|-------------|-----------|--|----------------|---|
|             | Time      | Reforms  | Time           | Reforms   |
| First wave  | 1984-1996 | Decentralization and devolution, reform of the community police ( <i>närpolisreform</i> )  | 1995-2001      | Decentralization and devolution, introduction of the proximity police ( <i>Police de proximité</i> )                      |
| Second wave | 1990-2002 | Output-orientation and performance measurement, new budget and planning system, personnel cuts, centralization                                     | 2002-2006      | Results-orientation ( <i>Politique du chiffre</i> ), reform of corps and careers, performance-related pay, centralization |
| Third wave  | 2005-2012 | Management by objectives, Total Quality Management, increased budget<br><i>Perspective: Stronger focus on soft indicators in police statistics</i> | 2007-2009-2012 | Enforced output-management<br><i>Perspective: Extensive use of statistics stopped by socialist government</i>             |

Own presentation, based on own data.

Second, despite the strong parallels we found differences in the intensity of the reforms. We attribute this to the *policy style of the employer*, as well as to the structure of the trade union movement. We will first focus on the policy style of the employer. As expected, in both countries employers took into account, at least to a certain extent, the views and positions of trade unions in the implementation process of reforms, instead of imposing their interest and acting the role of the sovereign employer who unilaterally controls employment relations (Bach and Kessler 2007). Nevertheless, there were strong differences in the interaction modes.

With regard to the interaction mode in Sweden, the Rikspolisstyrelsen acted in a rather consensual way towards the employees, even though it was more responsive in the implementation process of the second and third reform wave than in the first. However, the inclusion of the Polisförbundet in the drafting process of new public management reforms on governmental boards did not seem to have been a major issue since it was not mentioned in the magazines studied. In the implementation phase of the first reform wave, the RPS held on to the concept of decentralization and deregulation without increased budget due to favorable results in public surveys and regardless of objections of the Polisförbundet of the disfunctioning of the *närpolis* concept and concurrent budget cuts. After the centralizations in the second reform wave, a change in the responsiveness to employees' concerns could be observed. The centralization of police departments and management between 1993 and 2001 in order to reduce costs was supported by both the employer and the employee side and thus did not entail conflict potential. But since personnel cuts led to dissatisfaction of employees with their working conditions in the mid-1990s, the RPS acted more and more in the employees' interest. It used its information of deteriorated working conditions as well as its role as agent to repeatedly demand a higher budget from the government in favor of the employees. It also concluded favorable collective bargaining agreements with the Polisförbundet. In the following, the RPS

became more and more an ally to the trade union and reinforced employees' interests. Collective agreements concluded by the RPS and Polisförbundet were at one point so far-reaching that the government itself had to enforce its employer interests and rejected the collective bargaining agreement in 1996 through the Swedish National Audit Office (Riksrevisionsverket, RVV). In this way, the government granted a collective bargaining agreement of the RPS that entailed a budget increase in 2000. Thus, in 2003 the conflict between the RPS and the government escalated. The head of the Stockholm police department had to resign due to another collective bargaining agreement that involved budgetary deficits. This escalation led to a deterioration of employment relations, which was repeatedly mentioned by the Polisförbundet. Even though the RPS did not ally any more with the Polisförbundet and made only small budgetary concessions in the third wave, it took criticism of employees on performance measurement into account. Since 2012 it responded to the demand to include more "soft indicators" in the statistics such as citizens' trust into the police. As the Polisförbundet was hardly involved in drafting new public management reforms, the implementation of the reforms became more confrontational. Nevertheless, as a highly unified actor, Polisförbundet managed to mitigate negative effects for the workforce in the framework of a negotiated trade-off. This was also possible because of a rather fragmented and thus weaker employer, as collective bargaining took place in several bargaining arenas. To conclude, the RPS's strategy can be described as confrontational in the first reform wave, highly consensual in the second wave, and slightly confrontational in the third wave.

As in Sweden, the first reform wave of decentralization in France was not as politicized as the following. In the first wave, the employer acted in a rather consensual way. The main reform of this wave, the proximity police, was supported by the UNSA-Police, while it was criticized by Alliance. The Ministry of the Interior's communication efforts were relatively strong. According to its political orientation, UNSA-Police was the primary interlocutor. In the second reform wave, after the election of the UMP into government, the proximity police was soon abolished regardless of UNSA-Police's support for it. The second reform wave entailed a budget reform instead, as well as the introduction of performance measurement. The introduction of these reforms was confrontational, but the French Minister of the Interior used the strategy of pre-emptive trade-off and increased personnel and technical equipment beforehand in order to raise acceptance. During the second wave, the Minister accepted the trade union that was politically closer, Alliance Police Nationale, as primary interlocutor. In the encompassing corps and careers reform, the government used a more consensual strategy. It negotiated with both trade unions and successfully demanded concessions from them. In the following, the Ministry of the Interior gradually lost support of both trade unions. Nevertheless, it did not give up on the *politique du chiffre* and changed back to a confronta-

tional policy style. Only with the elections in 2012, the trade unions' demands were met by the socialist government. To conclude, the French employer deployed a consensual strategy in the first reform wave and pursued an increasingly confrontational policy style in the second and third reform wave. With the new socialist government, relations with trade unions became more consensual again in the end of the third wave.

Third, the intensity of the reforms depended on the *strategies and structure* of the trade unions. Polisförbundet as a highly unified actor brought forward universal demands that served all status groups of the police. This constituted Polisförbundet's strong influence in the reform process which was even strengthened in the second wave when the RPS adopted Polisförbundet's demands and passed them on to the government. Even when the Rikspolistyrelsen was disciplined by the government and could not promote employees' interest as much as before and relations became more confrontational, Polisförbundet still managed to improve the working conditions of their members. In France, trade unions were competing with each other so that the employer was able to play them off against each other most of the time. While UNSA-Police was the primary interlocutor in the first reform wave under the socialist government, Alliance became more active in the second reform wave under the UMP. It was relatively successful with its policy recommendations to the Ministry of the Interior due to their ideological closeness to the governing party. Nevertheless, in the drafting of the encompassing reform of the corps and the careers of the police, UNSA-Police, as still majoritarian police union, was involved as equal interlocutor. Both trade unions perceived these negotiations as successful, despite major restraints for the vast majority of their members, the *gardiens de la paix*. Following the logic of influence, the trade unions made concessions at the expense of their members which they subsequently had to justify towards their members. The cooperation of the trade unions can probably be attributed more to the extent of the reform and the will of the Minister to raise legitimacy of this encompassing reform, than to a change in trade union strategy. In the following, as only primary interlocutor again, Alliance supported basically all of the ministry's reforms in order to keep their position and the possibility to exert influence on the reforms. Also the disadvantageous treatment of the *gardiens de la paix* was tolerated up to a certain point. UNSA-Police, in turn, started to openly criticize a lack of cooperation on the Ministry's side and opposed the performance management, Sarkozy's *politique du chiffre*, after 2003.

From 2008 onwards, cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior was perceived as deficient by both trade unions. This time, it can be attributed to a change in strategy on the trade unions side who engaged in cooperation aiming at a revaluation of the salaries of the lower hierarchy levels. However, in the end, Alliance took the lead in the negotia-

tions with the Ministry which led to a non-satisfactory outcome from the perspective of UNSA-Police.

Although towards the end of the period analyzed the cooperation between the two trade unions ended, they still took the same stance on the reform policies. UNSA-Police's criticism of performance management became stronger, and also Alliance joined in towards the end of the legislative period of the Sarkozy government. At that time, UNSA-Police also decided to increase its influence by merging with the SGP-FO and became Unité Police. The increased criticism, and perhaps also the strengthened role of Unité Police, led to the addition of a citizen focus in management reforms by the Interior Ministry. Nevertheless, renunciation from extensive output-orientation was only achieved after the government changed in 2012 when the Hollande government stopped evaluation practices in order to review its statistical measures and restrain its use.

Even though in both countries trade union density was very high in the police sectors, trade unions were not equally successful in enforcing their demands. While in Sweden the Polisförbundet was clearly a respectable counterpart to the RPS and could offensively formulate its demands, the French police trade unions were constantly struggling for influence. As UNSA-Police/Unité Police and Alliance Police Nationale predominantly represent the *gardiens de la paix*, they raised particularistic demands. As a consequence, they did not receive additional support for their causes from trade unions of other status groups. Another aspect that impeded their success was the relative bargaining weakness of their status group. While the *gardiens de la paix* had to accept concessions and had to struggle for their pay increase for several years, the *commissaires* were promoted on the salary scale already at the beginning of the second reform wave without struggles. This can be explained with their strong workplace bargaining power during that period, that is, that they were crucial for the implementation of the ensuing reforms. Already in a rather weak position, the trade unions of the *gardiens de la paix* were not cooperating but competing for being the primary interlocutor of the Ministry of the Interior for most of the time. Following the logic of influence they even traded their members' interest for influence. Still, there were attempts of the two trade unions to cooperate. Their lack of success can mostly be attributed to the fact that Alliance always chose to use their privileged access to the ministry. The two trade unions were only truly fighting for the same goal when there was no official cooperation. Alliance was not as successful any more with its demands at that time and therefore both trade unions concentrated on their members' interests and demanded the Ministry of the Interior to refrain from its performance management policies.

Table 5: Summary of reform waves, policy styles and trade union strategies

| Wave   | Sweden  |   | France   |   |
|--|---|---|--|---|
|  | Policy implementation style                         | Trade union structure and strategy  | Policy implementation style                                    | Trade union structure and strategy  |
| <b>First wave:</b><br>Decentralization, devolution, proximity police | Confrontational                                     | Unified actor, unified demands<br>Logic of membership, offensive strategy | Consensual   | Fragmented actor, particularistic demands<br>Logic of influence, offensive and defensive strategies                     |
| <b>Second wave:</b><br>Performance management                        | Highly consensual                                   | Unified actor, unified demands<br>Logic of membership, offensive strategy | Increasingly confrontational, partly with preemptive trade-off | Fragmented actor, partly cooperating, particularistic demands<br>Logic of influence, offensive and defensive strategies |
| <b>Third wave:</b><br>Enforced performance management/ renunciation  | Slightly confrontational with negotiated trade-offs | Unified actor, unified demands<br>Logic of membership, offensive strategy | Highly confrontational, after government change consensual     | Fragmented actor, particularistic but uniform demands<br>Increasing use of logic of membership, offensive strategy      |

Own presentation, based on own data.

Last but not least, also *party politics* seemed to have played a major role in France. While in Sweden reforms were pursued rather consistently by the competing parties, reform programs depended strongly on the respective political party in the government in France. This was particularly relevant in the second reform wave when the Minister of the Interior at that time, Nicolas Sarkozy, used the results of the police statistics for his own career enhancement. This special situation, together with the strong competition among trade unions, might have fostered the exceptionally radical implementation of the results-orientation in comparison to the otherwise rather moderate French NPM reforms (Gautié 2013).

Table 5 summarizes the policy implementation style of the employer and the trade union strategy and structure that we assessed in the analysis. We will now refer back to our *hypotheses*. Not included in the table but discussed above, our findings are in line with Hypothesis 2 that points to the importance of the membership's workplace bargaining power for the success of a trade union. This was shown by the collective promotion of the *commissaires* on the salary scale while the *gardiens de la paix* and their main trade unions UNSA-Police and Alliance had to fight for several years to receive a pay increase. This finding also points to an increasing dualization within the public sector workforce. We also find partial support for Hypothesis 1. Indeed, trade unions responded with stronger resistance to confrontational policy styles. However, the analysis drew our attention to the rationale according to which the employer chooses its policy style. Also the policy implementation style depends on trade unions' reaction to previous employer behavior. The confrontational style in France was facilitated by the fragmentation of, and competition between, the trade unions. When trade unions formulated

uniform demands, the Ministry of the Interior seemed to be more open to trade union's demands. The very consensual style in Sweden is fostered by a highly unified trade union and could only be ended by intervention of the government that led to a more confrontational policy style again. We thus have to add to our Hypothesis 1 an element of interdependence that includes the anticipation of opposition from the trade union movement by the employer. With respect to Hypothesis 3 we observe a clear distinction in the responses of trade unions to management reform initiatives. The fragmentation of the French trade union movement fostered competition between trade unions for recognition and the acceptance of deals providing advantages for their own constituency at the expense of other groups of employees. Instead, the unified Swedish trade union jointly negotiated the reforms for all groups. Due to the heterogeneity of the membership, the Swedish police trade union did not pursue particularistic but universal demands. At the same time, we did not observe a particularly offensive strategy of the *Polisförbundet* that we explained with the *Rikspolisstyrelsen's* action in favor of the employees. In summary, the collected evidence supports our prediction that the French reform strategy would be more confrontational and encompassing than the Swedish, and that the French trade union response would be more defensive and piecemeal than the Swedish one. Moreover, the French trade unions are less effective due to the high fragmentation of the trade union movement, resulting in more far-reaching reforms than one would expect in a country that is characterized by a strong state and a strong civil service tradition.

*To sum up*, even though in both countries trade unions were comparatively strong in the police sector and the reform programs showed strong parallels, there were considerable differences in the intensity and implementation styles of the reforms, as well as in trade unions' influence and success. The evidence shows that these were determined by the fragmentation and competition among trade unions, but also the fragmentation of the employer side and its position in the state. For different groups in the workforce, also their function in the implementation of reforms was important. Either way, we find that in both countries governments cannot simply impose reforms on the police but at the same time have to rely on employees' support.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Alliance Police Nationale (2004-) *Alliance Police Nationale*, Paris: Alliance Police Nationale.
- Andersson, Patrik and Nils Henrik Schager (1999) The Reform of Pay Determination in the Swedish Public Sector, in Robert Elliott, Claudio Lucifora and Dominique Meurs (Ed.) *Public Sector Pay Determination in the European Union*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 240-84.

- Arbetsgivarverket (2004) *På rätt väg – en studie av den lokala lönebildningen på statens område*, Stockholm, Arbetsgivarverket, <[http://www.arbetsgivarverket.se/upload/Avtal-Skrifter/Skrifter/Pa\\_ratt\\_vag.pdf](http://www.arbetsgivarverket.se/upload/Avtal-Skrifter/Skrifter/Pa_ratt_vag.pdf)>.
- Arbetsgivarverket (2009a) *Central government and delegated employer responsibility - the Swedish Model*, Stockholm: Arbetsgivarverket.
- Arbetsgivarverket (2009b) *SAGE - The member organization for government employers*, Stockholm.
- Bach, Stephen and Ian Kessler (2007) Human Resource Management and the New Public Management, in Peter Boxall, John Purcell and Patrick Wright (Ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Human Resource Management*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 469–88.
- Bach, Stephen and Rebecca Kolins Givan (2011) Varieties of New Public Management? The Reform of Public Service Employment Relations in the UK and USA, *International Journal of Human Resource Management* 22(11), 2349-66.
- Baumol, William J. (1967) Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis, *American Economic Review* 57(3), 415-26.
- Baumol, William J. (1996) Children of Performing Arts, The Economic Dilemma: The Climbing Costs of Health Care and Education, *Journal of Cultural Economics* 20, 183-206.
- Baumol, William J. and William G. Bowen (1965) On the Performing Arts: The Anatomy of their Economic Problems, *American Economic Review* 55(1-2), 495-502.
- Berrebi-Hoffmann, Isabelle, et al. (2009) Capitalizing on Variety: Risks and Opportunities in a New French Social Model, in Gerhard Bosch, Steffen Lehndorff and Jill Rubery (Ed.) *European Employment Models in Flux - A Comparison of Institutional Change in Nine European Countries*, Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 178-200.
- Bézès, Philippe (2007) The "steering state" model: The emergence of a new organizational form in the French Public Administration, *Sociologie du Travail in English* 49 sup., 67-89.
- Bordogna, Lorenzo and Stefano Neri (2011) Convergence towards an NPM programme or different models? Public service employment relations in Italy and France, *The International Journal of Human Resource Management* 22(11), 2311-30.
- Borglund, Erik and Urban Nuldén (2006) Bits and Pieces of Information in Police Practice, <http://www.itu.dk/~elisberg/Includes/Papers/15/15-1.pdf>.
- Camfield, David (2007) Renewal in Canadian Public Sector Unions – Neoliberalism and Union Praxis, *Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations* 62(2), 282-304.
- Clark, David (1998) The Modernization of the French Civil Service – Crisis, Change and Continuity, *Public Administration* 76(Spring 1998), 97-115.
- Cole, Alistair (2010) State Reform in France: From Public Service to Public Management?, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 11(4), 343-57.
- Culpepper, Pepper D. (2002) Powering, Puzzling, and 'Pacting': the Informational Logic of Negotiated Reforms, *Journal of European Public Policy* 9(5), 774-90.

- Duncan, Colin (2010) The Impact of Two Decades of Reform of British Public Sector Industrial Relations, *Public Money & Management* 21(1), 27-34.
- Emmenegger, Patrick, et al. (2012) *The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gautié, Jérôme (2013) France: The public service under pressure, in Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead (Ed.) *Public Sector Shock: The impact of policy retrenchment in Europe*, 174-213.
- Gold, Michael and Ulke Veersma (2011) Public Sector Reform and Employment Relations in Europe, in Susan Corby and Graham Symon (Ed.) *Working for the State - Employment Relations in the Public Services*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 23-42.
- Hall, Peter A. (1986) *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hemerijck, Anton, Rien Huiskamp and Rob de Boer (2002) *Public sector reform under EMU - A literature review*, Dublin, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
- Hood, Christopher (1991) A Public Management for All Seasons, *Public Administration* 69, 3-19.
- Howell, Chris (1998) Restructuring British Public Sector Industrial Relations: State Policies and Trade Union Responses, *Policy Studies Journal* 26(2), 293-309.
- Ibsen, Christian Lyhne, et al. (2011) Challenging Scandinavian employment relations: the effects of new management reforms, *The International Journal of Human Resource Management* 22(11), 2295-310.
- Kettl, Donald F. (2005) *The Global Public Management Revolution (2nd ed.)*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
- Kittel, Bernhard (2003) Politische Ökonomie der Arbeitsbeziehungen - Akteure, Institutionen und wirtschaftliche Effekte, in Herbert Obinger, Uwe Wagschal and Bernhard Kittel (Ed.) *Politische Ökonomie - Demokratie und wirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Lane, Jan-Erik (2005) *Public Administration and Public Management: The Principal-Agent Perspective*, New York: Routledge.
- Loubet del Bayle, Jean-Louis (2010) Le syndicalisme policier français, *Cahiers de la sécurité* 13(juillet-septembre 2010), 159-71.
- Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen (2010) Explaining Gradual Institutional Change, in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (Ed.) *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-37.
- Maillard, Jacques de and Stephen P. Savage (2012) Comparing Performance: the Development of Police Performance Management in France and Britain, *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy* 22(4), 363-83.
- Mayring, Philipp (2008) *Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse*, Weinheim und Basel: Beltz.
- Ministère de l'intérieur (1997-) *Civique - le magazine du Ministère de l'intérieur*, Paris: Ministère de l'intérieur, Service de l'information et des relations publiques.

- Ministère de l'intérieur (2004) 17.06.2004 - Réforme des corps et carrières de la police nationale, <[http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-de-Dominique-De-Villepin-2004-2005/Interventions/ 17.06.2004-Reforme-des-corps-et-carrieres-de-la-police-nationale](http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-de-Dominique-De-Villepin-2004-2005/Interventions/17.06.2004-Reforme-des-corps-et-carrieres-de-la-police-nationale)>.
- Monjardet, Dominique, Christian Mouhanna and Maurice Chalom (2008) Réinventer la police, in Patrice Aubertel and François Ménard (Ed.) *La ville pour tous, un enjeu pour les services publics*, Paris: La Documentation française.
- Mucchielli, Laurent (2008) 8. Faire du chiffre : le "nouveau management de la sécurité", in Laurent Mucchielli (Ed.) *La frénésie sécuritaire*, La Découverte: Sur le vif, 99-112.
- Natali, David and Martin Rhodes (2004) Trade-offs and Veto Players: Reforming Pensions in France and Italy, *French Politics* 2, 1-23.
- OECD (2005) Performance-related Pay Policies for Government Employees, Paris: OECD.
- OECD (2008) *The State of the Public Service*, Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Osborne, David and Ted Gaebler (1991) *Reinventing Government. How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
- Page, Stephen (2005) What's New about the New Public Management? Administrative Change in the Human Services, *Public Administration Review* 65(6), 713-27.
- Palier, Bruno and Kathleen Thelen (2010) Institutionalizing Dualism: Complementarities and Change in France and Germany, *Politics & Society* 38(1), 119-48.
- Pebereau, Michel (2005) *Rompre avec la facilité de la dette publique - Pour des finances publiques au service de notre croissance économique et de notre cohésion sociale*, La Documentation française, <<http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/054004454/0000.pdf>>.
- Polisförbundet (1941-) *Polistidningen - organ för Svenska polisförbundet*, Stockholm: Svenska Polisförbundet.
- Polisförbundet (2013a) In English, <<http://www.polisforbundet.se/in-english/>>.
- Polisförbundet (2013b) Lokala avtal, <<http://www.polisforbundet.se/avtal/lokala-avtal/>>.
- Pollitt, Christopher and Geert Bouckaert (2011) *Public Management Reform - A Comparative Analysis: New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State* 3rd, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Premfors, Rune (1998) Reshaping the democratic state: Swedish experiences in a comparative perspective, *Public Administration* 76(Spring 1998), 141-59.
- Rikspolisstyrelsen (1962-) *Svensk polis - tidskrift för Sveriges polisväsende*, Stockholm: Inrikesdepartementet.
- Roché, Sebastian (2005) *Police de proximité: nos politiques de sécurité*, Paris: Ed. du Seuil.
- Rouban, Luc (2007) Public Management and Politics: Senior Bureaucrats in France, *Public Administration* 85(2), 473-501.
- Rouban, Luc (2008) Reform without Doctrine: Public Management in France, *International Journal of Public Sector Management* 21(2), 133-49.

- Schmitter, Philippe C. and Wolfgang Streeck (1999) *The Organization of Business Interests - Studying the Associative Action of Business in Advanced Industrial Societies*, *MPIfG Discussion Paper* 99(1).
- Silver, Beverly J. (2003) *Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and Globalization since 1870*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stenmark, Henric (2005) *Polisens organisationskultur - En explorativ studie*, Umeå Pedagogiska institutionen, Umeå universitet
- Swedish Ministry of Finance (1995) *The Public Sector Labour Market in Sweden. A Presentation*, Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Finance.
- Swedish National Police Board (2012) *The Swedish Police - An Introduction*, Stockholm, Swedish National Police Board, <[http://www.polisen.se/Global/www%20och%20Intrapolis/Informationsmaterial/01%20Polisen%20nationellt/Engelskt%20informationsmaterial/Polisen\\_en\\_presentation\\_110506.pdf](http://www.polisen.se/Global/www%20och%20Intrapolis/Informationsmaterial/01%20Polisen%20nationellt/Engelskt%20informationsmaterial/Polisen_en_presentation_110506.pdf)>.
- Tepe, Markus (2009) *Public Administration Employment in 17 OECD Nations from 1995 to 2005*, *Working Papers on the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe* REC-WP 12/2009.
- Traxler, Franz (1999) *The State in Industrial Relations: A Cross-national Analysis of Developments and Socioeconomic Effects*, *European Journal of Political Research* 36, 55-85.
- Traxler, Franz, Sabine Blaschke and Bernhard Kittel (2001) *National Labour Relations in Internationalized Markets: A Comparative Study of Institutions, Change, and Performance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Union nationale des syndicats autonomes de la police (UNSA) (2003-2008) *UNSA-police magazine*, Pantin: UNSA-police.
- Unité Police (2009-) *Unité police magazine*, Bagnolet: Unité police.
- van Reenen, Piet (1999) *The "Unpayable" Police*, *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* 22(2), 133-52.
- Westerberg, Anders Ivarsson (2004) *Papperspolisen: den ökande administrationen i moderna organisationer*, Stockholm: Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögskolan i Stockholm (EFI).
- Wright, Erik O. (2000) *Working Class Power, Capitalist Class Interests, and Class Compromise*, *American Journal of Sociology* 105(4), 957-1002.
- Yates, Jacqueline (2000) *Sweden*, in J. A. Chandler (Ed.) *Comparative Public Administration*, London u.a.: Routledge, 148-72.

**APPENDIX**

*Table 6: Category System*

|   | <b>Category</b>                       | <b>Definition</b>   |
|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| <b>Interaction of employers and employees</b> |                                       |   |
| 1   | Employer's structure                  | Structure of public employer  |
| 1a  | Segmented                             | Several employers that bargain separately, decentralized collective bargaining  |
| 1b  | Concentrated                          | One single employer, centralized collective bargaining  |
| 2   | Employer's strategy                   | Employer's style of implementing reforms  |
| 2a  | Consensual                            | Employer seeks to build support for reform from all involved parties  |
| 2b  | Confrontational                       | Employer imposes agenda with no concessions to involved parties; including negotiated trade-off and preemptive trade-off  |
| 3   | Trade union structure and cooperation | Trade union landscape and interaction of trade unions   |
| 3a  | Segmented                             | Many trade unions and/or trade unions that do not cooperate, high competition   |
| 3b  | Concentrated                          | Few trade unions and/or trade unions that cooperate   |
| 4   | Trade union logic                     | Logic that explains trade unions' strategic behavior  |
| 4a  | Logic of membership                   | Confrontation and resistance  |
| 4b  | Logic of influence                    | Recognition as interlocutor, provision of exclusive expertise   |
| 5   | Workplace bargaining power            | Accounts for heterogeneity of the public sector workforce and for the special role of top civil servants in the reform process  |
| 5a  | Particularistic                       | Demands in favor of one or few status groups  |
| 5b  | Universal                             | Demands in favor of all status groups or focusing on general wealth   |
| <b>NPM Reforms</b>                            |                                       |   |
| 6   | Management and performance            | Management by objectives, performance management  |
| 6a  | Extension                             | Focus on results, frame budgets, target formulation, use of police statistics, performance-related bonuses and pay, evaluation, contractualization, efficiency increases, reduction of personnel, strategic planning, performance plans |
| 6b  | Renunciation                          | Preventive police work, evaluation based on qualitative indicators  |
| 7   | Decentralization                      | Decentralization  |
| 7a  | Extension                             | Devolution of responsibilities to local police authorities  |
| 7b  | Renunciation                          | (Re-)Centralization, mergers, reduction of number of police departments   |
| <b>Working conditions and pay</b>             |                                       |   |
| 8a  | Improvement                           | Vocational training, conclusion of agreements, pay increases, working time regulation, new technologies and equipment, strengthening of internal communication and co-determination   |
| 8b  | Deterioration                         | Personnel cuts, pay cuts or stagnation, strengthening of hierarchies  |

Own presentation.

## **BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE**

**Jennie Auffenberg** is PhD Fellow at the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences at the University of Bremen.

*Telephone:* +49 (0) 421 218 66463

*E-Mail:* auffenberg@bigsss.uni-bremen.de

*Address:* Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences,  
University of Bremen, Wiener Straße/Celsiusstraße (FVG), D -  
28359 Bremen

**Bernhard Kittel** is Professor of Economic Sociology and Head of the Department of Economic Sociology at the University of Vienna.

*Telephone:* +43 (0) 1 4277 383 11

*E-Mail:* bernhard.kittel@univie.ac.at

*Address:* Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna,  
Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, A – 1090 Vienna